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Abstract
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Far-reaching changes in the regulation of financial 
markets and the organization of public pensions in 
the 1980s and 1990s transformed the landscape for 
retirement products in Sweden. First, banking and 
insurance were extensively deregulated in the 1980s, 
while the securities markets experienced major expansion. 
Insurance received a large boost from the authorization 
of unit-linked products in the early 1990s. Second, the 
public pension system was reformed. Survivor benefits 
for widows were eliminated from the public pillar in the 
late 1980s, leading to a large increase in demand for term 
life insurance. The old defined benefit public pension 
system was replaced by a notional or nonfinancial defined 
contribution (NDC) scheme, while a funded defined 
contribution (FDC) component was also created in 
This paper—a product of the Financial Policy Division, Financial Systems Department—is part of a larger effort in the 
department to contribute to the research on the payout phase of defined contribution pension system. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at rrocha@
worldbank.org.  
the public pillar. The four occupational pension funds 
that cover the majority of Swedish workers were also 
converted into FDC schemes. This paper reviews the 
implications of these changes for the Swedish annuity 
market. It discusses the regulation of payout options in 
Sweden, highlighting the compulsory use of life annuities 
in the public pillar and the preference for term annuities 
in the occupational funds. It examines the performance 
of providers of retirement products, including the PPM, 
and reviews the increasing focus on risk-based regulation 
and supervision. The paper also emphasizes Sweden's 
success in moving in the direction of increased funding 
and privatization of old age insurance, while maintaining 
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Preface 
 
This paper on the market for retirement products in Sweden is part of a broader project on life 
annuities and retirement products, coordinated by Roberto Rocha, program manager in the 
unit for Financial Markets for the Social Safety Net, of the Financial and Private Sector 
Development Vice-Presidency of the World Bank.  The project was initiated in 2004 to fill an 
apparent gap in the pension literature, especially in the literature addressing the payout phase 
of defined contribution pension systems.  Many countries that have implemented systemic 
pension reforms and introduced private pension systems are now facing the challenge of 
organizing the payout phase for retiring workers.  Organizing the payout phase entails 
introducing a well-regulated market for retirement products, covering the effective regulation 
and supervision of retirement products, marketing activities, providers and intermediaries.   
However, the literature on the payout phase is generally focused on a few countries and 
topics, and does not address in sufficient detail the institutional and regulatory issues faced by 
policy-makers in reforming countries.  
 
The World Bank project fills the gap by reviewing in detail a number of representative 
country cases, including Australia, Chile, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland.  These 
countries have large mandatory or quasi-mandatory private pension systems operating 
primarily on a defined contribution basis and have already entered the payout phase.   
Moreover, their institutional and regulatory arrangements for the payout phase are different in 
many aspects, including decentralized and centralized arrangements for the provision of life 
and term annuities, different menus of retirement products, different approaches to price 
regulation and risk-sharing, different marketing rules, and different capital rules for providers.  
Therefore these countries provide a rich variety of experiences and policy lessons for other 
reforming countries. 
   3
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1  INTRODUCTION  
 
Beginning with the passage of initial legislation in 1994, Sweden converted its defined benefit 
public pay-as-you-go pension scheme - dating from 1960 - into a combination of pay-as-you-
go notional or non-financial defined contribution
  (NDC) and funded or financial defined 
contribution (FDC) schemes. A third component, a defined benefit (DB) guarantee, 
constitutes the floor of the overall system. NDC and FDC individual accounts were created in 
the implementation process and in January 1999 all covered participants received their first 
account statement. Individuals could make their first fund choices in the FDC scheme in 2000 
and the first NDC and FDC benefits were paid out in 2001.  
 
The conversion of the earnings-related public scheme from defined benefit to defined 
contribution set off a chain reaction among occupational pension schemes. This led to the 
partial conversion from largely non-financial DB to FDC schemes of the major schemes for 
public sector workers and the full conversion of schemes for private sector workers. These 
schemes provide supplementary benefits to around 90 percent of Sweden’s labor force. In 
2006, the last major occupational scheme made this conversion. As a result, within a little 
more than a decade after 1994, the entire old-age insurance landscape was completely 
transformed.    
 
This change in the structure of insurance for old age will have major repercussions on the 
private insurance market in Sweden in coming decades. First, as the public mandatory FDC 
scheme matures, the overall demand for annuities will increase dramatically. This can be 
expected to lead to pressure to privatize the present government monopoly in annuity 
provision. Second, the conversion of occupational pension schemes to funded FDC will create 
new demand for retirement products. Furthermore, these landmark events are bound to have 
repercussions on the development of individual voluntary insurance. First, because women 
live on average around seven years longer than their spouses, one can expect the demand for 
individual, voluntary insurance to increase. Second, there should be an increasing awareness 
in general among persons with short earnings careers, for whatever reason, that they may need 
to supplement their public and occupational benefits with private voluntary insurance to 
ensure that they have sufficient coverage in old age. Generally speaking, in the future, 
increasing longevity, better health and the demand for continued, but perhaps more flexible, 
working arrangements will also create demand for new types of insurance products. All of 
these factors together can be expected to influence both the scale and types of insurance 
products demanded and supplied in the future. Finally, the regulatory environment for dealing 
with financial risks is presently changing and will have to continue to evolve to meet coming 
developments in the market. This study presents evidence in support of this thesis.   
 
The study begins by acquainting the reader with the institutional framework of the Swedish 
pension landscape, briefly discussing the process of evolution that has led to an almost 
complete transition from DB to DC. Following this, the third chapter examines the 
development of the present demand for retirement products in Sweden. This analysis provides 
insights into the relation between the scale and composition of the public sector’s 
commitment and the development of private insurance in the past decades. The experience of 
Sweden can be especially illuminating in understanding how a country can move in the 
direction of increased funding and privatization of old age insurance, while maintaining its 
basic character as a highly developed welfare state. The fourth chapter examines the insurance   6
products available and the market suppliers of these products. The fifth chapter analyzes the 
management of risks and discusses the structure of financial market supervision in Sweden. 
The final chapter focuses on conclusions and possible lessons for other countries.         
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2  AN OVERVIEW OF PENSION PROVISION IN SWEDEN 
 
This chapter provides an overview of pension provision in Sweden. It begins with a brief 
history, followed by three separate sections devoted to the new mandatory public pension 
system. Next Sweden’s occupational schemes are presented. These provide supplements to 
the mandatory public NDC and FDC schemes for earnings below the ceiling covered by the 
public mandate. In addition, they constitute a major and for many participants the only benefit 
for earnings above the ceiling in the mandatory system. The chapter concludes with a picture 
of the overall replacement rate for the mandatory and occupational schemes together, 
followed by some final remarks. 
 
2.1  Brief History of Pensions in Sweden   
 
Occupational pension benefits in Sweden date back to 1770 when the Riksdag granted civil 
servants the right to retire at age 70 with the salary they had prior to retirement. Regulated 
private pension insurance dates back about a hundred years when, in 1904, Parliament passed 
Sweden’s first regulatory legislation. At the same time a supervisory authority was created to 
oversee private insurance companies. The next major step came in 1917, when a group of 
employers established Svenska Personalpensionskassan (SPP) to administer their pension 
plans. SPP remained a leader in this capacity into the 1990s and, following restructuring in 
recent times, is still an important player in the private insurance market. Pension plans for 
local government (county and municipality) employees also emerged and by the mid-1940s 
almost all counties, larger municipalities and towns had pension plans for their employees.
2  
 
Public pension insurance began with legislation in 1913 creating a universal public benefit 
from age 67 (folkpension), which was converted into a universal flat rate benefit in 1948. In 
1960 the universal public earnings-related scheme, ATP (Allmänna tilläggspension) was 
introduced. This meant that from 1960 all residents of Sweden were covered by the flat-rate 
folkpension and, in addition, if they had earnings from work, by the public ATP scheme, with 
a full benefit retirement age of 67.
3 A full folkpension required 30 years of residence. A full 
ATP benefit required 30 years of coverage (contributions) and was based on the participant’s 
best 15 earnings years. In 1976 the full-benefit retirement age was decreased to 65.
4  
 
With the implementation of ATP in 1960 – which covered old age, disability and survivors – 
a publicly administered pension fund, the AP fund,
5 was set up. From the outset and for most 
of the life of the ATP system, the contribution rate was set at a higher level than was needed 
to cover current payments with the aim of building up a fund. Two reasons were given for 
this. The first was to counterbalance an expected decline in private saving following the 
introduction of the pay-as-you-go ATP scheme. The second was to provide a demographic 
fund for the large cohort of persons born in the 1940s. By 1990 net assets held by the fund 
amounted to about 40 percent of GDP, could cover about five years of benefit payments, and 
                                                 
2 Palmer and Wadensjö (2004) provide a more comprehensive overview of supplementary pensions in Sweden.  
3 There was an actuarial deduction for early retirement, possible from age 60, and an actuarial increment for late 
retirement. 
4 The folkpension was financed by a combination of employer contributions and general tax revenues and ATP 
was financed by an employer contribution. Folkpension and ATP benefits were price indexed.  
5 The AP fund was actually several funds. Three funds investing in various bonds were initially set up. In 1974 
an equity fund was added, which was later joined by a second equity fund. The AP fund system also presently 
holds the reserves in the new NDC scheme.     8
were between one-seventh and one-tenth of what was needed to fully fund commitments at 
the time (Reformed Pension System 1994). In the end, income from fund investments was 
needed to help finance current payments and projections showed that the fund would be 
exhausted by around 2010 without dramatic increases in the contribution rate. This is 
illustrated by the fact that, in 1994, the ATP contribution rate was 13 percent, but a rate of 17 
percent was needed to cover exactly that year’s current payments (Reformed Pension System 
1994). 
 
At the time of the introduction of the mandatory public earnings-related ATP scheme in 1960 
there were already earnings-related private occupational plans covering three major groups of 
employees: civil servants and other state employees, municipal employees, and most privately 
employed white collar workers. However, blue collar workers were not covered by 
occupational plans at the time, which was the main political driving force behind the 
introduction of the ATP scheme. With the introduction of ATP in 1960, existing occupational 
benefit plans were all converted into benefit plans supplementing the public ATP scheme. 
This round of reforms was completed when in 1974 the blue collar confederation 
(Landsorganisationen – LO) negotiated an occupational supplementary scheme for its 
members. 
 
The most recent milestone in public pension provision began with the 1994 legislation and 
conversion of the folkpension/ATP system into mandatory NDC and FDC schemes, with, as a 
consequence, an accompanying shift in the major occupational schemes to FDC. Sweden’s 
new pension landscape is described here.  
 
2.2  The New Mandatory Public System 
 
The mandatory public NDC and FDC schemes are financially self-contained insurance 
systems. By definition, they maintain a fixed contribution rate over all future generations. Of 
course, an FDC scheme maintains a fixed contribution rate by definition. What is new in the 
Swedish context is the creation of a pay-as-you-go NDC scheme that over time also maintains 
a fixed contribution rate on earnings. This means that there is not only a ceiling on individual 
earnings covered, a micro constraint, but also a macro constraint, as the fixed contribution rate 
also fixes the percent of the national product mandated to earnings-related public old-age 
pension commitments. 
 
The macro constraint is achieved in practice in the NDC scheme through indexation and by 
introducing life expectancy at retirement in the calculation of benefits in both the NDC and 
FDC schemes. What different cohorts and individuals within these cohorts receive in the form 
of benefits will be determined by earnings profiles, the rates of return on accounts during 
years of participation and the development of life expectancy. The move to a DC world shifts 
more of the responsibility for determining income in old age to individuals, which can be 
expected to be reflected in future individual labor supply and saving decisions.    
 
The public NDC and FDC schemes cover earnings up to a ceiling, which is indexed yearly 
with the rate of growth of the nominal per capita covered wage. This means that the real level 
of the ceiling is preserved over time with respect to an average wage. In 2008, the ceiling was 
a little over 60,000 USD (using an exchange rate of 6 kronor per USD). There is also a 
threshold for covered earnings, which in 2008 was about 2,900 USD.  Contributions are paid 
on all earnings from employment and income from self-employment between the floor and   9
the ceiling, with a contribution rate of 16 percent for the NDC scheme and 2.5 percent for the 
FDC scheme. There is also a guaranteed pension level which is provided in the form of a top-
up to the NDC and FDC benefits combined, which can be claimed first from the age of 65, 
and which is financed with general revenues from the national budget. The NDC and FDC 
benefits can be claimed with an actuarial deduction from age 61, but the total amount must be 
great enough so as not to trigger the guarantee at age 65. 
 
The following three sections describe the components of the public scheme in greater detail. 
 
2.2.1  The NDC Scheme 
6 
 
Although the NDC scheme was complete in all details but the construction of its automatic 
balancing mechanism with the passage of the 1994 legislation, implementation had to wait 
until January 1999 when individuals received their first account statements. The initial delay 
was for political reasons as the new Social Democratic government taking office after the 
autumn 1994 elections gave the party’s members a “time out” to communicate the principles 
of the new reform.
7 Following this, final legislation was written, not only for the NDC and 
FDC schemes, but also supporting legislation (for the guarantee, the housing allowance 
available for low income pensioners and revision of the tax code to eliminate the separate 
deduction for pensioners); new IT systems were created; and historical data were accumulated 
and used to create the initial NDC accounts.   
 
Like in a financial account scheme, in NDC individuals – and employers on their behalf - pay 
contributions on all working career earnings during the accumulation phase. These accounts 
earn an internal rate of return and the account balance is converted to an annuity at retirement, 
any time from the minimum retirement age of 61. In the NDC scheme contributions go 
towards paying the benefits of contemporaneous pensioners, as in any pay-as-you-go scheme. 
The annuity is based on the retiree’s account balance and the life expectancy of the retiree’s 
birth cohort at the age of retirement. The individual can claim his or her NDC and FDC 
annuities separately, at different times, and either for the full or part of the account balance. 
At the same time the individual may choose to either exit from the labor force or continue to 
work full or part-time and, hence, pay additional contributions on earnings, which eventually 
give an incremental benefit. 
 
In addition to earnings, benefits from other forms of social insurance compensating for 
income loss give entitlements in the NDC and FDC account schemes. The most important of 
these are unemployment insurance, sickness and disability insurance and benefits paid during 
parental leave. The national government’s contributions to the individual’s old age benefit for 
these periods of compensation are paid into the individual’s account from general tax 
revenues, i.e., from the central government budget.
8 The amounts of these contributions are 
also noted in the accounts of the respective insurance budgets and are viewed as part of their 
overall costs. Also, non-contributory credits are given for military service, higher education 
                                                 
6 There are now many references to the Swedish NDC scheme. A generic NDC scheme is presented in Palmer 
(2006), while Holzmann and Palmer (2006) provide an anthology of papers dealing with the various aspects of 
NDC schemes, with numerous cross-references to the Swedish case. 
7 Palmer 2002 and Könberg, Palmer and Sundén 2006 discuss the implementation process in depth. 
8 Contributions have an employee and an employer component. The employee component of sickness, parental 
leave and unemployment compensation is paid by the individual.   10
and to parents (one at a time) for up to four years after the birth of a child. These too are 
financed from the central government budget.  
 
Account balances of persons who die prior to the minimum retirement age of 61 are 
distributed annually on a birth cohort basis to the survivors in the cohort. The NDC benefit is 
a yearly payment until death determined by dividing the amount on the individual’s NDC 
account at retirement with a so-called annuity divisor, which is determined not only by life 
expectancy at the time of retirement but also by an imputed real rate of return of 1.6% during 
the expected life of the annuity.  Benefits are price indexed and adjusted further for deviations 
(positive and negative) in the real rate of growth of the average covered wage from the 1.6 
percent real rate of growth assumed in the calculation of the annuity. 
 
The NDC annuity divisor makes the pension system (almost) robust with regard to changes in 
longevity. But estimates of life expectancy are based on cross-sectional data available at the 
time benefits are calculated and do not take into account likely future changes in cohort 
longevity and, as a result, longevity may be persistently underestimated.  In an NDC scheme 
liabilities cannot exceed assets, just as in FDC schemes. In the Swedish NDC framework an 
automatic balancing mechanism (ABM) is employed to attain this equivalence.
9 When 
necessary (when liabilities are greater than assets) the ABM adjusts account values of workers 
and benefits of pensioners with an index based on the deviation of liabilities from assets. The 
Swedish ABM also adjusts upwards, but only to a level equivalent to the path of the per capita 
wage indexation index, that is, the level of indexation that would have occurred without the 
ABM intervention. The balancing mechanism in the NDC scheme resembles the 
positive/negative bonus system employed by private insurance in Sweden, to be discussed in a 
later chapter.  
 
2.2.2   The FDC Scheme 
 
The FDC scheme was partially implemented already in 1995, when the first contributions 
were paid. Money from 1995 and succeeding years was held at the National Debt Office, with 
a government bond rate of return, until the new system’s administrative apparatus was in 
place. The first individual portfolio choices were made in the autumn of 2000.   
 
The mandatory individual financial account scheme is managed by a separate government 
agency, the PPM (Premiumpensionsmyndigheten – or Premium Pension Authority), which 
was set up specifically for this purpose. The PPM is the clearinghouse for fund transactions, 
maintains individual accounts, collects and makes available (daily) information on 
participating funds, provides other information services to participants, and is the monopoly 
annuity provider.  
 
Contributions for the financial account scheme are collected together with all other social 
insurance contributions, including NDC contributions - and taxes in general - by the National 
Tax Authority. New contributions are transferred to individual accounts annually, after 
income-tax reconciliation, on average about 18 months after they have been paid. During the 
interim they are held on an account at the National Debt Office where they earn a bond rate of 
return. 
 
                                                 
9 The ABM is discussed in depth in Settergren 2001.   11
The PPM acts as a broker between participants and the participating private funds. Fund 
shares purchased with new payments of contributions, fund choices by new entrants, and 
requests for fund switches are all grouped together and executed jointly on each transaction 
day by the staff of the PPM. The transactions are registered on individual accounts kept by the 
PPM. A fund manager’s client is the PPM, not the individual participant. 
  
All fund managers, licensed to operate in Sweden and fulfilling the requirements stipulated in 
the European Commission’s UCITS directive (85/611/EEG, including later modifications), 
are allowed to participate in the PPM system. Fund managers are required to follow the rules 
and regulations set out by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Agency (SFSA), which 
supervises the funds. Fund providers must sign an agreement with the PPM, which includes 
agreeing to provide information upon request, not to charge withdrawal fees, to compute and 
report on a daily basis fund share values electronically to the PPM, and to provide a periodic 
report of administration charges.  
 
The agreement that fund managers conclude with the PPM also involves accepting a system 
of maximum fee charges. What this means in practice is that a fund can levy its normal 
administrative fee minus a discount that depends on the balance of its PPM assets. Since there 
are economies of scale in large holdings of PPM assets, the size of the allowable 
administration fee decreases with the scale of PPM assets managed by the fund. The exact 
construction of the allowable fees in the PPM system is described in the Appendix (Tables 
B1.a and B1.b). In 2007, total costs for the scheme amounted to 45 basis points. By around 
2020, when the scheme has come much closer to maturity and the initial loan for establishing 
the business is paid off, total costs are, according to this author’s calculation,  likely to be 
around 23-27 basis points, with a higher concentration of PPM money in a smaller number 
companies (funds) yielding the lower result. 
 
A company registered to do business in the PPM system can provide one or more funds. At 
the time of this writing, there are over 86 domestic and foreign companies managing around 
785 funds. There is a publicly managed default fund (AP7) for non-choosers, which presently 
holds the assets of around a third of the system’s participants, but a smaller percentage of 
assets, since choosers tend to have higher account balances. Switching is allowed on a daily 
basis, although switching transactions take around three business days. In 2007 about 15 
percent of participants performed one or more switches, with an average of three per year per 
switching person and a total of 2.6 million transactions. Over 90 percent of switches were 
performed using the PPM’s internet site.  
 
The PPM is the sole provider of annuity products for the public FDC scheme. These are 
specified in law. Participants can choose between single and joint life annuities, which can 
take the form of fixed or variable rate products. Around 90 percent of PPM pensioners have 
chosen a single and about 10 percent a joint life annuity. Lump-sum payments or withdrawals 
over shorter periods than a life are not permitted. A pre-retirement survivor benefit can also be 
contracted. 
 
If they choose a fixed-rate life annuity, participants turn over their fund balances at retirement 
to the PPM, which presently enlists the investment services of a publicly managed fund for its 
bond portfolio and, beginning in 2007, four private funds for managing its equity portfolio. A 
variable-rate annuity results from leaving the account balance in the individual’s chosen 
private fund, with an annual recalculation of the annuity based on the remaining account 
balance and the original life expectancy factor. Accounts can also be transferred to spouses, 
which to date only a few thousand participants have done. Most (about 85 percent) of PPM   12
pensioners have chosen variable rate annuities. Annual pension amounts are still very small, 
however, due to the very short coverage time and the gradual transition rules. 
 
In its first year of operation, in 2000, there were 4.4 million participants in the PPM scheme. 
By the end of 2007 the number had increased to 5.8 million (Table 1). When the scheme 
reaches maturity, some 8-9 million participants are projected to be covered by the scheme, 
given present net immigration patterns. Note that individuals retain their balances even after 
emigrating from the country. At end 2007 there were about 450,000 pensioners in the PPM 
plan, about a quarter of all pensioners. 
 
The annual flow of new funds into the system has been about one percent of GDP. The overall 
portfolio’s market value fell considerably below its purchase value with the dot.com equity 
crash in 2001-2002 and did not fully recover until 2005, as Table 1 shows. At end 2007, total 
assets equaled 308 billion SEK – equivalent to about 10 percent of GDP. The average nominal 
rate of return from 1995 through 2007 was 5.8 percent (with a rate of inflation of around 2 
percent), according to the PPM’s Annual Report for 2007. Recall that, until the autumn of 
2000 money was invested in government bonds, awaiting the first portfolio choice. This 
together with the dot.com crash shortly after fund choices were made has undoubtedly held 
down the average return. 
 
When the first individual portfolio choices were made in 2000, about two thirds of all 
participants chose funds actively. They chose about 3.4 funds per person. The number of 
funds held per person has remained slightly above 3 since then. Persons with previous 
investment experience, higher income and higher education were more inclined to choose, 
whereas the youngest participants were the most inclined to passively let their money go to 
the default option (Engström and Westerberg (2003)). About 90 % of all PPM funds were 
originally invested in equities. The percentage has fluctuated since then, dropping as low as 
70 percent with the dot.com decline in equity prices in the early 2000s. 
 
Table 1.  Number of participants and assets in the PPM scheme 
 
        
 
Year New  entrants 
Number of 
participants 
Total assets on December 31. 
As percentage of GDP 
     Purchase  value  Market  value 
        
2000  4 400 000  4 400 000  2.5  2.3 
2001  493 000  4 900 000  3.2  2.8 
2002  196 000  5 100 000  4.0  2.5 
2003  150 000  5 200 000  4.7  3.8 
2004  129 000  5 300 000  5.3  4.9 
2005  117 000  5 410 000  6.1  7.2 
2006  114 000  5 570 000  7.4  9.4 
  2007  133 000  5 840 000  8.5  10.0  
Source. The PPM       
 
The number of active choosers among new entrants has steadily declined since 2000 and in 
2007 it reached a new low of only 2 percent, following a change in the information 
procedures of the PPM. The fact that most new PPM participants do not choose funds actively 
has drawn considerable attention both in Sweden and internationally. Upon closer reflection, 
however, this is not so surprising since many new entrants are in their teens and early 
twenties, often students or others with intermittent earnings. In fact, these days, Swedes reach   13
normal labor market participation at around age 25. Another large group of new entrants are 
immigrants entering the Swedish labor market for the first time. Participants are not allowed 
to switch into the default fund, which also means that once participants exit this fund they 
cannot return, which may also be a deterrent for switching out. It is noteworthy that, to date, 
the default fund, which has maintained an equity content of around 80 percent, has 
outperformed the average of all privately managed PPM funds, which for many must provide 
an incentive to stay. The real test will be to see to what extent new entrants opt out of the 
default fund as they become older. 
 
2.2.3  The Minimum Pension Guarantee 
 
Of course, for various reasons not everyone will be able to contribute sufficiently to qualify 
for an adequate earnings related pension. For this reason the safety net in the Swedish public 
pension system is a guarantee benefit. The pension guarantee is a defined benefit that can be 
claimed at age 65. It is means-tested against the individual’s combined NDC and FDC 
benefits.  It is price-indexed and is financed with revenues from the central government 
budget. Its real level can be increased discretionarily by parliament, but to date this has not 
occurred. Figure 1 provides an overview of how the guarantee is constructed. The amount of 
the guarantee is approximately 30% of the average wage. 
 
 
Figure 1.. The guarantee pension and its relation to the combined NDC-FDC pension. 
 
 
Source: The Annual Report of the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2008. 
 
2.2.4  The Public Commitment - Summary Remarks  
 
The conversion of the public pension system from defined benefit to defined contribution put 
a ceiling on future public sector pension commitments. This is illustrated by the macro-
calculations for future pension expenditures performed regularly for the European 
Commission. According to these, in spite of a continuously ageing of the population,   14
Sweden’s public expenditures on old age pensions will only increase moderately through 
2050, from 10.6 to 11.2 per cent of GDP (see Table B2 in the Statistical Appendix to this 
paper),
10 including an assumption that the level of the guarantee grows at the same real rate as 
the per capita wage. 
 
Furthermore, the conversion from defined benefit to defined contribution in the main public 
system sets out clearly where the public commitment to individuals stops. The conversion 
from a DB to a DC framework means, ceteris paribus, that individuals will have to save more 
on their own or work longer to neutralize the effect of increasing life expectancy on the 
annuities provided by the public NDC and FDC schemes and the occupational FDC schemes. 
According to current estimates of life expectancy at age 65, a person born 1970 will live about 
two years longer than a person born 1940. Assuming the retirement age for the worker born 
1940 is 65, then the worker born 1970 will have to work until 66 years and seven months to 
receive the same annuity in the NDC scheme as the typical wage earner born 1940 – all other 
things equal. In other words, retirement must be postponed about a year and a half in response 
to an increase in longevity of two years. 
 
The Swedish public is kept informed about the development of longevity and other 
developments in an annual report for the pension system published by the Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency.  More importantly for individuals is that they all receive a personal annual 
pension statement. 
 
2.3  Occupational Pension Schemes 
 
There are four major occupational benefit schemes in Sweden that together cover almost 90 % 
of all employees. These provide a two-tier supplement to the public system benefits. First, 
they provide a top-up for covered earnings under the ceiling in the public system, and, second, 
they provide a “full” benefit for earnings above the ceiling. This section provides a brief 
summary of changes in occupational benefits. A more detailed exposition is provided in 
Appendix A.    
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the number of employees covered by each collective 
agreement. The four major occupational schemes cover the following groups of employees. 
The SAF-LO agreement encompasses over 40 percent of all employees, working mainly in 
agriculture, mining, lumbering, industry, trade, transport and communications.
11 The second 
largest agreement, KAP-KL, covers employees working with health care services, services for 
the aged and handicapped, other social services and education, police and firemen. All of 
these are employed by the local governments or county councils. The agreement covering the 
third largest group, ITP-ITPK, covers most privately employed white-collar workers, 
excluding persons working in banking, insurance, journalism and architecture. The latter 
groups have separate supplementary plans. The fourth largest scheme covers civil servants 
                                                 
10 Note that the guarantee is assumed to increase with the real rate of growth from 2010 in these calculations, 
even though it is indexed to prices according to the legislation. This reflects an assumption that politicians will 
eventually have to increase its real purchasing power. 
11  The following unions are members of the LO confederation: Construction Workers, Electricians, Painters, 
Industrial Workers, Workers in the Paper and Pulp Industry, Workers in the Forestry and Lumber Industries, 
Workers in Retail Sales, Hotel and Restaurant Employees, Workers in Food Processing, Workers in 
Telecommunications and Public Transport, Goods Transport Workers and Manuel Workers in the Municipal 
Sector.     15
and other national government employees. Among the latter are university employees, and 
persons working in social security, employment and judiciary services. 
 
Table 2.  Major Groups Covered by Contractual Benefits in Sweden, 2005 
 
 Number  of 
covered 
employees 
Percent of  
employed 
persons  
    
Private white-collar employees, ITP-ITPK    700 000
1    16.4 % 
Employees covered by the SAF-LO agreement  1 831 000    43.0 % 
Civil servants and other national government employees, 
KAP-KL 
   256 000      6.0 % 
Municipal and county council employees      853 000    20.0 % 
Insurance and bank employees, architects, journalists 
 
 
   130 000 
 
     3.0 % 




Prior to the reform of the public pension system, beginning in 1994, all the occupational 
schemes provided defined benefits. Only the benefit plans covering the white collar workers, 
that is, ITP, were financial defined benefit (FDB) plans. The plans for workers covered by the 
SAF-LO agreement were funded at the time of retirement, while the plans for public sector 
workers were pay-as-you-go – that is, they were non-financial defined benefit (NDB) plans.  
 
What is important in the present context is that, beginning with the news in early 1994 that the 
public earnings-related scheme was to be converted to a DC format (originally from 1997), 
one after the other, all the occupational schemes converted to DC for supplementary benefits 
under the ceiling for the public commitment. The first to convert were the blue-collar workers, 
beginning in 1996. The move was completed as the sector scheme for private white-collar 
employees converted in 2007. There is a period of transition for each major sector scheme, 
with the longest being for ITP, which only covers (fully) cohorts born 1979 and later.  
 
For private-sector employees, benefits provided over the ceiling have also been converted to 
DC. However, the schemes for public sector employees still provide pay-as-you-go defined 
benefits  above  the ceiling, combined in the case of civil servants and other national 
government employees with a small FDC component. Nevertheless, most employees’ 
earnings are below the ceiling, so as a result of the transition to FDC in occupational benefits, 
most commitments, including most public-sector employee commitments have become 
funded. 
 
2.4  Replacement Rates after the Reforms of the 1990s  
 
A consequence of the reform of the public pension system and the accompanying reforms of 
the occupational schemes is that all earnings below the ceiling in the public scheme are 
covered by defined contribution schemes. The typical employee is covered by three DC 
schemes, first, the mandatory public NDC scheme with a contribution rate of 16 %, second 
the PPM managed mandatory public FDC scheme with a contribution rate of 2.5 %, and, 
third, a quasi-mandatory occupational FDC scheme with a contribution rate of 3.5 – 4.5   16
percent. The 3.5 % contribution rate is the initial rate for the large LO collective agreement. 
Note that by the end of 2007 all major collective agreements either had a contribution rate of 
4.5 % or had a transition schedule to move to 4.5 % in the future.  
 
Table 3 presents calculations of income replacement rates for a person born 1975, who enters 
the labor force at age 22 and works all years to retirement at one of the ages specified in the 
table, with the present unisex life expectancy projection for this birth cohort from the various 
specified retirement ages. Use of unisex life expectancy is a requirement of a European court 
ruling for both public and occupational schemes. Note that inheritance gains (account 
balances of the deceased under the minimum retirement age that are distributed to surviving 
participants in the insurance pool) are not included in these calculations, which means that 
benefits are slightly underestimated. Calculations have been performed assuming that the 
occupational scheme pays a contribution rate of 3.5 %, which is directly applicable to an LO 
employee.  
 
The results show that the long career worker would have a considerable replacement rate with 
a 5 % rate of return. The results suggest that coverage is sufficient, even if the worker were to 
work fewer years than the number (from age 22) assumed in the calculations. 
 
 
















Calculated for a person entering the labor force at the age of 22 and who works every year until retiring at the 
age indicated in the table. Earnings grow at a rate of 2 % per year. Indexation in the NDC scheme is also 2 % per 
year. Unisex life expectancy for a person born 1975 is used to calculate annuity values. The NDC annuity is 
based on life expectancy and an assumed real rate of annuity growth of 1.6% during the annuity period. The 
calculations do not include a possible increment deriving from the capital of non-survivors.     
Source. Palmer 2002.  
 
2.5  Summary 
 
In sum, seen in the present context, the reform of the public system had three effects on the 
development of pension schemes in Sweden. The first was that it set a clear ceiling on the 
scope of the mandatory public system, establishing the room left for private occupational and 
individual initiative. Second, the major occupational schemes were converted into DC 
schemes for the supplements to the public scheme under the ceiling for the public 
commitment. By 2007, all major occupational pension schemes had been converted from 
 
Return of :  Return of:
Age  2%  5% 8% 2% 5%  8%
61  0.32  0.12  0.23
 
 
0.47 0.44 0.55  0.79
62  0.33  0.13  0.25 0.52 0.46 0.58  0.85
63  0.35  0.14  0.27 0.57 0.49 0.62  0.92
64  0.37  0.15  0.29 0.63 0.52 0.66  1.00
65  0.39  0.15  0.31  0.69 0.54 0.70  1.11
66  0.42  0.16  0.33 0.76 0.58 0.75  1.18
67  0.44  0.17  0.36 0.83 0.61 0.80  1.27
68  0.47  0.18  0.39 0.92 0.65 0.86  1.39
69  0.50  0.19  0.42 1.01 0.69 0.92  1.51
70  0.53  0.20  0.45 1.12 0.73 0.98  1.65
Total. Public PAYG and Second Pillar  






rate of 16 %
Public Second Pillar (2.5%) + Group 
Occupational (3.5%)  17
defined benefit to defined contribution for the supplement they provide for earnings covered 
under the ceiling in the public system, albeit with transition rules to reach full maturity. The 
schemes for private (blue and white collar) are also defined contribution for benefits above the 
ceiling, while the schemes for public sector workers combine a small DC component with a 
DB component for earnings above the ceiling.  
 
Thirdly, the overall FDC component for the typical employee – whose entire earnings will be 
under the ceiling for the public system – consists of contribution rate of 6.0 to 7.0 percent (2.5 
+ 3.5 or 4.5). This will give rise to considerable capital accumulation that will need to be 
converted into insurance products at retirement. This, in turn, can be expected to stimulate the 
future development of the annuity market. The next section focuses in depth on the current 
demand for insurance products and discusses how developments from the mid-1990s are 
likely to affect future demand. 
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3  THE DEMAND FOR RETIREMENT PRODUCTS 
The point of departure for this discussion of the demand for retirement products in Sweden is 
a survey of the institutional environment over the past quarter century. The survey identifies 
and discusses a number of institutional changes that have paved the way for future growth in 
the magnitude and diversity of privately provided retirement products. The second part of the 
chapter discusses the factors that affect the demand for private insurance, setting these in a 
Swedish context, and the third part discusses the role played by various retirement products in 
the overall income of present pensioners. The chapter concludes with an indication of the 
outlook for the demand for annuities in the coming decades of the 21
st century. 
 
3.1  The Changing Landscape Surrounding Private Insurance  
 
In 2004, 26 percent of the total assets of households were in private individual insurance 
(Table 4) and about 40 per cent of the population 20-64 years old utilized a tax deduction for 
payments of private insurance premiums (Figure 2). This has not always been the case. As 
recently as 1980, private insurance constituted only 9 per cent of the total assets (denoted TA 
in Table 4) of households, even though for at least the two decades prior to the mid-1980s 
private insurance provided the best after-tax return among all forms of personal saving 
(Palmer 1985). Nevertheless, in 1980, only about 4 percent of persons aged 18-64 utilized a 
tax deduction for premiums paid for private insurance (Jonannisson 2000). Clearly, then, the 
demand for private insurance has increased substantially in the past couple of decades.  
 
Table 4.  The Financial Portfolio of Households, year-end figures 
 
 1980  2005 
  SEK bn  % TA  % GDP  SEK bn  % TA  % GDP 
Individual Insurance  34 9 6.0  657  26  24.6 
Equities 36  10  6.7  565  22  21.2 
Mutual  Funds  ** ** **  484  19  18.1 
Bank  Deposits  182 50 33.5  619 25  23.2 
Bonds 43  12  8.0  107  4  4.0 
Currency  28 8 5.4  87 3  3.3 
Other 44  12  8.0  2  0  0.1 
Total 367  100  67.0  2521  100  94.4 
Source: Statistics Sweden and Palmer (1985) for 1980 data. 
 
In the 1980s a number of structural changes in the financial market dramatically altered the 
landscape for individual saving in general and created indirectly a better environment for 
private insurance. In addition, the 1990s brought structural tax and pension reforms, with 
direct bearing on the development of contractual saving, as we have already indicated. Here 
we summarize the most important institutional developments.     
 
Well into the 1980s, the Swedish financial system was constrained by a comprehensive array 
of quantitative restrictions on bank and insurance company portfolios, such as lending ceilings 
on banks and portfolio composition requirements for all financial institutions. These 
restrictions favor investments in bonds at the expense of equities, while interest rates were 
regulated by the central bank rather than determined by market forces (Gottfries, Persson and 
Palmer 1989). A general wave of financial liberalization in Europe in the 1980s spread also to   19
Sweden and after the mid-1980s, most financial market restrictions had been lifted. By 1990, 
the process of financial deregulation had been concluded. 
 
With financial deregulation, the Swedish stock market began to grow and develop as a major 
source of risk capital. This was accompanied by strong performance and high rates of return 
on equities, stimulating public interest in investing in the equity market. These developments 
had two effects. The first was that the interest of savers was now focused on the stock market 
with its high returns rather than the insurance market with its more conservative investment 
policies and illiquid saving. The second was that the development of the stock markets 
prepared the ground for the introduction of unit-linked insurance, which was to develop into a 
popular saving vehicle. In addition, deregulation made possible the introduction of financial 
derivatives, which today constitute an important pillar for the financial market. 
  
The second wave of reforms affected the pension system. A first step in the reform of the 
public pension system, initiated in the latter half of the 1980s, resulted in a political agreement 
to abolish from 1990 the publicly provided widow’s benefit beginning with the cohort of 
women born in 1945. Prior to the announcement of this change in the legislation, in 1988, the 
proportion of persons 20-64 claiming a tax deduction for insurance premiums was increasing, 
but only slowly. Also, in the early 1980s almost twice as many men as women utilized a 
deduction. With the announcement and then passage of legislation removing the publicly 
provided widow’s benefit for younger cohorts, the number of persons utilizing a tax deduction 
to purchase voluntary private insurance increased significantly, beginning with an increase of 
almost 50 percent in the short period between 1987 and 1990 (Figure 2). Not surprisingly, 
then, since 1992 more women than men have utilized a tax deduction to purchase private 
insurance. 
 
The growth in the percentage of the population contracting private insurance continued to be 
strong through the turn of the century. This occurred despite a reduction in the ceiling on the 
yearly premium that could be deducted for tax purposes from a little over 11,000 USD to 
5,500 USD in 1995 (using an exchange rate of 6 SEK per USD). The ceiling is not absolute, 
as smaller deductions can be claimed up to a higher absolute ceiling.  Using the same 
exchange metric, the average size of a deduction was 1,560 USD in 1990 (Johannisson 2003). 
With the decrease in the ceiling and the increase in demand from women with lower earnings 
the average size of the deduction decreased to 1,000 USD in 2003. (See Appendix Table B3 
for more detailed information.)  
 
Table B3 in the statistical appendix provides a detailed picture of the distribution of 
deductions claimed in 2003 by gender, age and income class. In 2003, in all income classes, 
more deductions were claimed by women than by men up to the highest income class with 
income of 1 million kronor (167,300 USD) and over per year. In the income class above 1 
million kronor men dominate.  In income classes up to 1 million kronor, women deduct about 
the same amount as men on average - or slightly more. In the highest income class, 1 million 
kronor and above, the average deduction of men is considerably higher than for women, 
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Figure 2.  Persons utilizing a tax deduction for pension saving. 
Percent of all population 20-64. 
 
Figure 2. Persons utliizing a tax deduction for 
























Source: Data from Statistics Sweden.  
 
A third major structural change was a substantial reform of the tax system, which went into 
effect in 1991. With this reform all forms of saving were given the same income tax status. 
This improved the relative price of saving in financial instruments compared with borrowing 
for current consumption or for housing investments. It is noteworthy that individual saving 
had reached a post-war low at the end of the 1980s, and a major focus of policy in the initial 
years of the 1990s was on reversing this downward trend.   
 
In 1993, a fourth major change occurred when legislation enabling unit-linked insurance went 
into effect. Whereas traditional life insurance still followed conservative insurance principles, 
unit-linked insurance allowed the individual to make his/her own investment choices during 
the accumulation phase, including choices from among equity funds. Since 1993, an 
increasing share of growth in the assets of life insurance companies has come through unit-
linked contracts. 
 
A fifth legislative change influencing the development of private insurance was the 
introduction of individual retirement saving (IRS) accounts in 1994. New saving in an IRS 
account is tax deductible under the same (gross) rule as premiums paid for private insurance. 
As with private insurance, accounts must be held at least to age 55, and withdrawals must be 
made over a period of at least five years. Banks and investment funds provide the account 
services, and the saver can usually choose among a number of alternative funds. Individual 
retirement accounts are not a perfect substitute for insurance, since they do not cover the risk 
of longevity, but are more liquid compared to traditional insurance with life annuities. For this 
reason, they have become an attractive saving form that competes with insurance policies.   
 
A sixth major structural change was the reform of the public pension system, already 
discussed. The reform of the public pension system, first with the presentation of the proposed 
framework in 1992 and the ensuing discussion, and then with the presentation of the actual 
proposal and its passage by Parliament in June 1994, had three important effects on the 
development of the private insurance market.  
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First, as has already been discussed, the introduction of defined contribution in the public 
schemes clearly limited the scope of the public commitment and in doing so focused interest 
on individual responsibility for retirement. In fact, the public discussion for several years, 
beginning in 1992, was focused on the reform’s “losers”, that is, persons with short earnings 
careers, which may already then have caused additional purchases of private insurance. 
Secondly, one of the components of the reform was the mandatory financial account scheme 
itself, which would provide an injection of new money into the market, with the entire 
working age population as participants. Thirdly, as was discussed in the first section, the 
reform of the public system led to conversion of a large segment of the quasi-mandatory 
occupational pension schemes from defined benefit to defined contribution financial account 
schemes.  
 
Finally new legislation was implemented from May 1, 2008 making it possible to switch 
providers within the EU for all new contracts and for existing contracts where this is not 
prohibited by the contract. It is expected that further liberalization will follow enabling 
freedom of movement even for contracts existing prior to May 2008 that explicitly prohibit 
switching. The increase in freedom to move between providers can be expected to increase 
competition for customers through provision of better insurance products with lower 
administration fees. This should also help spur the development of a more robust domestic 
annuity market. 
 
In sum, a number of institutional developments, occurring largely from the mid-1980s to the 
mid-1990s, paved the way for the development of what has become a rapidly expanding 
market for retirement products in Sweden. The most important institutional change was the 
pension reform. This encouraged increased voluntary and occupational contractual saving for 
retirement in general, but also provided a very strong stimulus to saving with investment 
funds in particular. The latter also benefited from the new mandatory FDC scheme managed 
by the PPM, the transformed occupational pension schemes and the growth of demand for 
unit-linked insurance. In conclusion, the reform of the public pension system in Sweden also 
had far-reaching repercussions for the development of the Swedish financial market. 
 
3.2  Factors Affecting the Demand for Private Retirement Products 
 
A point of departure in discussing the demand for annuities is the seminal work of Yaari 
(1965) which demonstrates that individuals without a bequest motive can best maximize their 
life consumption in the face of the longevity risk by holding annuity assets. If they also have a 
bequest motive they will hold a portfolio with both annuity and bequest assets, with the 
distribution being determined by equating the marginal utility of bequests with that of own 
consumption. Evidence from a number of countries summarized in Impavido, Thorburn and 
Wadsworth (2003) indicates that Yaari’s prediction from theory is still, however, not borne 
out in practice. In practice, only a very small proportion of the population purchases private 
annuities.  
 
The literature contains a number of papers that attempt to shed light on why individuals do not 
purchase annuities to the extent predicted by theory. The first and most frequently cited 
reason for the very low level of individual demand for private annuities is that the mandatory 
system of a country sufficiently fulfills most individuals’ needs for longevity insurance. A 
second reason is that the bequest motive is strong. Annuities can come into conflict with the 
bequest motive and self-insurance within families. The more general desire to save in liquid 
assets, which provide flexibility, is a third reason. A fourth, obvious reason is that individuals   22
may not understand the benefits of annuitization. This is discussed, for example, in Brown 
(2000). Finally, with both a desire to protect against the longevity risk and to provide 
bequests, individuals are constrained in trading across states because financial markets are 
incomplete. This prevents individuals from creating an optimum portfolio. Impavido, 
Thorburn and Wadsworth emphasize the potential of this shortcoming.  
 
In sum, there are many possible explanations of why demand for private annuities is observed 
to be low internationally. At the same time, both mandatory pension and financial market 
institutions are changing rapidly around the world and Sweden, as we have seen, is no 
exception. As we will argue below, after examining how retirement products are presently 
utilized in Sweden, the events of the past 10-15 years can be expected to lead to a strong 
increase in future demand for retirement products provided through the private market. 
 
3.3  Present Level of the Demand for Private Annuities         
  
Ideally, to study the demand for insurance products, we would study data on the prevalence of 
the different products among recipients, by age, gender and even other variables of interest. 
Sweden does not collect even rudimentary data on the distribution of insurance products, 
however. So this is not possible. On the other hand, there is information on the distribution of 
public, occupational and individual voluntary benefits. We use this data here to examine the 
role of private voluntary insurance in the retirement income portfolio of individuals needs to 
be seen in a broader context together with public and occupational pension schemes. 
 
To begin with we can note that the income of Swedes 65 and older is on average 65 percent of 
that of the average 55-64 years old worker (Table 5). Remarkably, this percentage has 
remained unchanged for over a decade from 1991 to 2004, apart from a slight improvement in 
the relative status of persons 75 and older. However, due to the relative weights of the 
younger and older groups of retirees this change had no effect on the average for all persons 
65 and older.   
 
Table 5.  Income of persons 65+ as a percent of income of persons 55-64.   
Income is measured as equivalent disposable income. 
 
    
Age   1991  2004 
      
65 – 74    74 %  74 % 
75 +    56 %  58 % 
      
65 +    65 %  65 % 
           
Source. See Table B4 in the Statistical Appendix. 
 
It is worth noting that some of the difference between the older and younger pensioners 
reflects the fact that until 2001 public benefits were only price indexed. With price indexation, 
as retirees grow older the value of their benefits relative to the earnings of a contemporary 
worker fall as real earnings of workers increase.
 12 As a part of the recent reform of the public 
                                                 
12 If the real rate of growth is 2 % per annum, the relation between the average benefit and the average wage will 
decline by about 25 %, reducing a ratio of 75 % to 55 %.   23
pension system, from 2001, there is a positive real growth increment to pensions claimed both 
under the old and the new rules. When real covered wages grow by more than 1.6 percent, the 
difference gives rise to real indexation of benefits equal to the difference between 1.6 and the 
actual rate of growth of the per capita (covered) wage - in addition to normal price 
indexation.
13 This still falls short of full wage indexation, however. 
 
For all persons 65 and older earnings and entrepreneurial income constitute about 6 percent, 
capital income 12 percent, pensions 78 percent and housing allowances about 4 percent of 
total income.
14 Earnings and entrepreneurial income, not surprisingly, are more important for 
younger pensioners. They constitute about 15 percent of total income for persons 65-69 years 
old, with a steeply declining profile thereafter. As people age and the importance of earnings 
decreases, pensions and capital income become the main sources of income.   
 
Table 6 provides data on the distribution of individuals’ pension income between public, 
occupational and voluntary insurance. Table B5 in the Statistical Appendix includes more 
detailed information, including data broken down by gender. From the data in Table 6, it is 
possible to calculate that the public pension constitutes 71 percent, the occupational pension 
23 percent and the income from private individual insurance 6 percent of the average pension 
income.   
 
Table 6.  Composition of Old Age Pensions 2004 
 
                                         
      Of which                            
    Public old age pension       Contractual benefit   
 
  With a guarantee 
benefit
1    
Private individual 
pensions 




























                          
All  1 863 855  135.5   1 571 252  113.8 1 563 149 112.1   1 461 832  40.4    370 547 40.1
                          
55-60  143 788  58.6   0  0 0 0.0   110 588  59.4    50 291 36.8
61-64  178 470  105.0   36 207  63.1 28 569 55.0   137 264  100.6    55 825 47.6
65-69  404 411  167.8   397 646  118.0 397 442 111.0   358 079  42.8    150 624 37.3
70-74  345 153  1563   345 128  125.1 345 128 125.1   288 900  28.7    59 959 41.5
75-79  312 167  140.9   312 154  117.5 312 154 117.5   242 082  25.8    25 047 41.6
80-84  264 352  130.0   264 349  108.9 264 349 108.9   189 950  25.9    15 840 42.5
85-89  143 187  122.3   143 183  101.3 143 183 101.3   94 249  27.9    8 764 42.9
90-  72 327  107.6   72 324  88.6 72 324 88.6   40 720  29.8    4 197 37.9
              
Source. Statistics Sweden. 
 
 
The data in Table 6 also suggest that the different sources of benefits fulfill different needs. 
First, six percent of all beneficiaries in 2004 were under the minimum age (61) to claim a 
public benefit. Their benefits consisted of either an occupational pension, a private individual 
pension or in some – surprisingly few - cases both. In many cases, employees obtain 
occupational benefits as a form of severance pay, which does not prohibit them from taking 
                                                 
13 Recall that the NDC benefit is frontloaded with growth of 1.6 % from the time it is issued. The mechanism 
described here corrects for the difference between 1.6 and the actual oucome. 
14 Statistics Sweden (2004).   24
new jobs, which many do. Private benefits can be claimed from age 55 and are withdrawn 
over a period of at least five years. They too can be combined with continued employment.  
 
Another observation coming from Table 6 is that the average occupational benefit for the age 
group 61-64 is relatively large, whereas the average public benefit in this age group is small. 
There is a straight-forward explanation for this. Occupational benefits will often be the main 
benefit between ages 61 and 64, as they will be used to cover early retirement from the labor 
force, a) for those few occupations where early retirement is specified in the employment 
contract (e.g., firemen) and b) for persons who, either as a result of their own or their 
employer’s initiative, choose voluntarily to leave the labor force in their early sixties deferring 
withdrawal of their public benefit until later, until just recently usually at the age of 65. With 
the implementation of the reform more people have begun to work longer, deferring 
withdrawal of both occupational and public benefits. For those who take out occupational 
benefits prior to the age of 65, except for the few occupations for which early retirement is 
still specified by contract, occupational pensions are normally reduced to compensate 
actuarially for early retirement payments, leaving a smaller amount for a supplement to the 
public benefit from age 65.       
 
Why is age 65 so important in the Swedish pension landscape? First, age 65 was the age at 
which one could draw an unreduced benefit in the old DB scheme. Second, given this, labor 
agreements more or less established this as the mandatory pension age up until 2001, by 
obliging employees to leave their workplaces at this age. In 2001, this practice was curbed by 
anti-age discrimination legislation establishing the right to maintain employment until age 
67.
15 Hence, prior to 2001, for the majority of employees, occupational benefits were 
normally claimed at age 65 and provided a supplement to the public benefit. The data in Table 
6 suggest that there may also be a tendency to claim occupational benefits for the required 
minimum five-year period, where this is permitted, as their average value falls substantially 
after age 70.   
 
The data show that voluntary individual benefits provide a substantial supplement to yearly 
income primarily for persons younger than 75 years of age. As has already been noted, they 
are especially important for persons retiring prior to age 65. Nevertheless, 65-69 year olds 
constitute the largest age group receiving a voluntary pension. This could be due to higher 
demand for private supplementary insurance among younger cohorts of retirees, in line with 
the trend increase in purchases of private voluntary insurance noted above. Alternatively, it 
could result from individuals taking advantage of the possibility to claim benefits according to 
the 5-year minimum rule to supplement income in the initial stage of retirement. What is most 
likely is that the outcome has been determined by both of these explanations.
16 Finally, the 
data indicate that private life annuities have not been an important form of longevity insurance 
for older cohorts of retirees.         
 
The relative insignificance of annuities among present older cohorts reflects saving decisions 
made well over a quarter of a century ago, when these cohorts were in the workforce. There is 
evidence from other sources that at least into the mid-1980s Swedes viewed their mandated 
                                                 
15 The politicians involved in the Swedish pension reform tried to convince the unions and employer 
representatives to abolish this age, which they refused to do, which led to this legislation. Many now believe that 
Parliament should have set an even higher age.  Note that prior to (and after) this legislation persons 65 (and now 
67) and older could still be contracted by the same or a new employer, however, at present, new earnings do not 
give additional rights within the occupational schemes past age 65, nor are contributions paid.      
16 Chapter 4 below presents an in-depth analysis of the various retirement products available on the Swedish 
market.   25
public saving as sufficient longevity protection. A series of studies undertaken about two 
decades after the introduction of the universal mandated earnings-related defined benefit 
(ATP) scheme in Sweden (Markowski and Palmer 1979, Palmer 1981, Berg 1982 and 
Ståhlberg 1983) all indicated that individual private saving was lower than it otherwise would 
have been as a result of the introduction of the mandatory earnings-related pay-as-you-go 
ATP scheme in 1960. Together, these studies suggested that the decline may have been about 
4 per cent of disposable income per year between 1960 and 1980.
17  
 
In sum, the general picture through 2005 is that private insurance constituted only 6 per cent 
of the average of benefit from the public, occupational and individual schemes taken together. 
Less than 20 percent of all persons with a benefit had a benefit from individual voluntary 
insurance. To date, those with individual insurance tend to use this saving vehicle to help 
finance early retirement – from 55 through 64 - or to supplement income during the first five 
to ten years after what until very recently has been regarded as the “normal” retirement age of 
65. Finally, people normally defer claiming a public benefit until age 65. Those retiring prior 
to this normally finance their retirement by drawing on an occupational benefit. Since, 2001, 
however, age 65 is no longer necessarily the “normal” pension age; people have begun to 
work longer as this was made easier through the introduction of non-age discrimination 
legislation. The possibility to work past age 65 will undoubtedly affect the structure of 
benefits claimed in coming years. It is also likely that the age for non-age discrimination will 
be raised in the not so distant future.  
 
3.4  The Future Demand for Private Annuities  
 
As we have already established, there is no data available on the distribution of different 
products among claimants. There is, however, data on the age distribution of total pension 
payments between public, occupational and voluntarily contracted benefits suggesting that 
present claimants have chosen to use voluntary insurance as an income supplement in younger 
years – up to age 75 – rather than as a life annuity. It is reasonable to expect that the demand 
for retirement products to help finance consumption in the early years of retirement will 
become even greater after the transition of the public system and occupational supplements to 
defined contribution, since the actuarial deduction discourages early retirement with a reduced 
public benefit. Instead, those who can afford it will be more reliant on private saving, 
including private insurance, to retire early. 
 
The potential scale of future demand can be illustrated with the volume of premiums presently 
flowing into the market.  Table 7 shows that in 2006, contributions into occupational
18 and 
private voluntary pension insurance were the equivalent of 6.8 percent of GDP and 
contributions to the mandatory public PPM scheme about 0.9 percent of GDP. Note also that 
contributions to private voluntary insurance alone were also about 1 percent of GDP. 
 
                                                 
17 Note that this decline was offset by an increase in public saving - through the partial funding of the ATP 
scheme (Markowski and Palmer 1979 and Palmer 1981). 
18 Including payments to Alecta, which administers the ITP plan for private sector white collar workers and to 
SPV, the organization that administers insurance for civil servants and other employees in national service.   26
 
Table 7.  Assets and premium payments to occupational, individual voluntary and PPM plans, 2006 
 
    
 Assets Premiums   
All occupational and individual 









Percent of  GDP  80  %  6.8  %
* 
    
PPM, billions of kronor  267  26 
Percent of GDP  9 %  0.9  % 
    
*Voluntary individual insurance accounted for about 15 %. 
Source. Author’s calculations based on data from the PPM and Financial Supervisory 
Authority   
 
From the information in Table 7 it is possible to calculate that in 2006 Swedes paid 29 billion 
kronor in premiums for private voluntary life and pension insurance, which is about 5 billion 
USD (with an exchange rate of 6 kronor per dollar). It is very difficult to make meaningful 
inter-country comparisons because of the differences between countries in institutional set-
ups. If simply taken at face value, however, the data indicate that the market for voluntary 
insurance in Sweden is strong by international standards. This conclusion can be drawn 
through comparison with figures cited in Impavido, Thorburn and Wadsworth (2003). More 
specifically, according to Cardinale et al. (2002), total premiums in the UK for voluntary 
pension insurance amounted to £ 8 billion (about 15 billion USD) at the turn of the century.  
 
It is not easy to foresee the future based on the present structure of benefit payments. What we 
know, however, is the following. First, Sweden’s pension landscape is dominated by the 
public mandatory and quasi-mandatory occupational schemes. Together, these command 23 
percent of earnings. For the average worker, with a working career of around 40 years, the 
earnings related benefits from these two schemes together should be sufficient to provide an 
adequate pension. In addition, individual outcomes can be enhanced either by postponing 
retirement or through individual saving. Voluntary individual insurance constitutes one of the 
options available to accomplish this. 
  
Second, we have seen that the restructuring of the mandatory public commitment created two 
new demand segments. One is persons with earnings careers that are too short to receive a 
public benefit much over the guarantee level. There are many reasons why this might occur, 
but the result is the same regardless of the cause, the need to purchase private voluntary 
insurance. The other is married women, who statistics tell us can expect to outlive their 
spouses by five to seven years (five due to longevity and two due to the average age 
difference between spouses). Given that Sweden has abolished the subsidy from unmarried to 
married couples implicit in a pay-as-you-go survivor (widow’s) benefit – the demand from 
women for longevity insurance can be expected to continue to increase. Finally, private 
voluntary insurance will remain the major form of coverage supplementing the public system 
for the self-employed. 
 
The challenge for providers is to create products that cater to the needs of an ageing 
population with largely healthy younger pensioners and where many will desire to combine 
work with a retirement benefit into higher ages than previously. More generally, as career life 
income continues to increase, insurance provides a logical option for allocating personal 
resources to future (leisure) time in various ways, this also undoubtedly requires rethinking   27
product supply. In sum, demand for voluntary insurance products will rely on the capacity of 
the insurance industry to provide products that create to new pension withdrawal profiles. 
 
3.5  Final Remarks 
 
In spite of a need for more private voluntary insurance just discussed, money going into the 
occupational schemes and the PPM will continue to make up the bulk of the market in the 
future. Although PPM accounts will all be converted into variable or fixed rate life annuities, 
given the present law, it is difficult to guess what the distribution of products demanded 
through the occupational and private voluntary schemes will be in the future. Many 
individuals will certainly still want to use these saving vehicles to help finance early 
retirement and higher consumption in the first 5-10 years of retirement, as today, whereas 
persons with short earnings careers should increasingly demand life annuity products. Even 
here there seems to be much latitude for product innovation, not the least in order to satisfy 
the needs of female spouses. What is also clear from the analysis in this section is that the 
demand for annuities will grow exponentially in the coming decades as the new PPM and 
occupational DC schemes mature. And, with the maturation of the PPM scheme it is 
reasonable to ask, why shouldn’t contractual savers be allowed to combine PPM, occupational 
and voluntary DC retirement lump-sum balances and purchase annuity products for the 
accumulated sum?  The next question is to what extent should and can annuity money be 
allowed to move freely among providers, without giving rise to the sort of adverse selection 
that would cause annuities to become overpriced?  
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4  INSURANCE PROVIDERS AND INSURANCE PRODUCTS
19 
4.1  Introduction 
 
There are two categories of providers of annuity products in Sweden: Private insurance 
companies and mutual benefit societies, which provide annuity products for group 
occupational and individual accumulation schemes, and the PPM, which is the monopoly 
provider of annuity products for the financial pillar of the mandatory pension system. This 
chapter surveys the suppliers of retirement insurance products and presents and discusses the 
products they provide.   
 
4.2  Overview of Providers of Private Insurance Products   
 
At year’s end 2007, there were 42 life insurance companies operating in Sweden with 
Swedish authorization. In addition, a small number of life insurers and IORPs (institutions for 
occupational retirement provision) from other EU member countries have operations in 
Sweden through branch offices. Despite this relatively large number of companies, the bulk of 
business is concentrated in only seven companies. These seven major companies account for 
over 90 percent of individual premium payments and hold 97 percent of the total assets of life 
insurance companies (Table 8). The same seven companies are the major providers of both 
individual voluntary insurance and occupational group schemes. It is noteworthy that three of 
the seven companies are owned by three of the largest banks in Sweden - SEB, 
Handelsbanken and Swedbank.  
 
To complete the picture of insurance provision in Sweden, three more companies should be 
included. The first is Alecta, the life insurance company that (together with Collectum) 
administers the ITP contractual plan, but which does not sell individual voluntary insurance. 
The second is the credit-risk insurer, FPG, which insures pension liabilities of companies 
retaining the premium payments of employees covered under various plans (book reserves). 
The third is SPV, which manages contributory schemes for civil servants and other employees 
of the Swedish state. With these additions, the market value of total assets equaled 80 percent 
of GDP, while total premium payments amounted to 6.8 percent of GDP in 2006 (Table 8). 
 
Table 9 provides an overview of key financial data for Swedish life insurance companies. 
Among other things it becomes clear that the sum of premiums, investment returns and the 
change in the market value of assets was close to twice the amount needed to cover benefit 
payments and technical reserves/insurance liabilities, that is, to fulfill what are called 
guaranteed commitments. Sweden’s insurance companies offer what is called traditional 
insurance, which combines a contractual guarantee with a bonus based on the company’s 
investment surplus – above what is required to secure the guarantee. The guarantee is 
presented and analyzed in detail in Section 5 below. In 2006, the operating surplus for all 
companies was 131 billion kronor for the year 2006. This constitutes an uncommitted surplus, 
some of which can be distributed to the insured sometime in the future, as a bonus in 
traditional insurance, to be elaborated on below. 
 
 
                                                 
19 I am grateful to Björn Palmgren, from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, for reading and providing 
comments on Sections 4 and 5.   29
Table 8.  Distribution of Assets and Premium Payments for Life and Pension Insurance among major 







Percent of assets of all 
companies 
 
Percent of total premium 
payments 
 
1  Skandiakoncernen   25 %  19 % 
2  SEB Trygg Liv  19 %  17 % 
3  AMF Pension  18 %  11 % 
4 Handelsbankskoncernen
  12 %  12 % 
5  Länsförsäkringar  10 %  8 % 
6 Folksam
  9 %  12 % 
7  Swedbank (Robur) Insurance  4 %  10 % 
8  Others  3 %  11 % 
9  All companies  100 %  100 % 
      
 
10 
All companies (excluding Alecta, 





11   All companies (excluding Alecta, 





      
12   Alecta, billions of kronor   300
a  19 
13  FPG – Reinsured company book assets  125  0.2 
14  SPV - Civil servant scheme  295  50 
14  All companies, billions of kronor   2 270  193 
15  All companies, % GDP  80 %  6.8 % 
      
a Author’s rough approximation. 
Source: Swedish Insurance Federation and author’s calculations. 
 
Table 9.  Overview of Key Financial Data for Swedish Life Insurance Companies
1), 2006. Millions of 
kronor 
 





        




        




       




     







            - 
Surplus 
paid out to 
the insured 
 





          + 
Individual Insurance 
   Traditional life  insurance  16 228  28 010  15 694  17 977  2 279  1 666  26 316 
    Unit linked life insurance  26 857  1 809  18 544  20 382  19 892  1 203  1 341 
    Permanent health insurance  1 107  1 138  501  703  -83  213  1 443 
    Group life insurance   5 224  1 288  294  3 853  -271  540  1 461 
    Health  and accident 
insurance 
458 628 172 718  -162  -5  413 
           
Occupational Group Insurance 
   Defined benefit  16 145  38 291  13 803  10 845  -1 106  0  45 826 
   Defined contribution, 
traditional 
28 427  38 949  19 744  9 250  12 324  24  48 257 
   Defined contribution, unit-
linked 
25 323  1 654  8 586  2 919  31 583  0  698 
   Health & accident insurance  6 795  1 367  399  1 915  108  87  5 599 
           
Total   126 564
1  113 134  77 737  68 562  64 564  3 728  131 354 
           
1) Taking into account deposit share distribution and a couple of other small factors, total premium payments, adjusted for this, were 
118 905 in 2006. 
Source. Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority and Statistics Sweden. 
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4.3  The Mandatory FDC Scheme and the Market 
 
Individual choices in the mandatory FDC scheme administered by the PPM have favored 
Sweden’s seven largest private insurance providers. Together these seven companies held 43 
percent of total PPM assets in the end of September, 2007 (Table 10). The default fund (the 
Seventh AP-Fund) held an additional approximately 29 percent. Thus, the seven major 
companies and the public default fund manage about three quarters of all PPM assets. 
 
Table 10.  PPM assets held by the seven largest private insurance companies and the Sevent AP fund 
(default fund), September 28, 2007 
 
   
 
Percent of total PPM 
assets  Percent of GDP 
     
Seventh AP-fund  29%  2.7 % 
    
   The Seven Major Private Insurance 
Companies    
1. Swedbank Robur Försäkring    14%  1.3 % 
2. Handelsbanken & SPP    9%  0.9 % 
3. AMF    9%  0.8 % 
4. Folksam    5%  0.5 % 
5. Länsförsäkringar    3%  0.3 % 
6. SEB     2%  0.2 % 
7. Skandia     1%  .1 % 
    Total  43 %   4.2 % 
    
   Seventh AP-fund and the seven major 
private companies   72%  6.9 % 
    
Total PPM assets  100%  9.6 % 
       
Sources. The author’s calculations using data from the PPM.  
 
 
The largest company in the market for PPM assets is Swedbank Robur Insurance, owned by 
Swedbank, with a 14 percent market share. Robur was one of the first companies to provide 
investment funds on the private market in Sweden, beginning in 1967, and has apparently 
been able to benefit from its early lead in this market. The second, third and fourth largest 
companies are SPP (part of which is now a subsidiary of Handelsbanken), AMF and Folksam, 
all of which have been major players historically in the market for occupational pension 
schemes. Undoubtedly, this gave them an initial advantage in attracting PPM clients. 
 
Table B6 in the Appendix shows in detail how the total assets of the PPM scheme are 
distributed among the 50 largest funds. It is noteworthy that the top four private providers 
manage 29 of the largest 50 funds, ranked in terms of asset values. The next three major 
providers manage an additional six of the top 50 funds, which means that 35 of the largest 50 
funds are managed by Sweden’s seven largest private insurance providers. The second and 
third largest funds in the system, AMF Pensions Aktiefond – Sverige and  AMF Pensions   31
Aktiefond - Världen, Swedish and world market index funds respectively, held 6 percent of all 
PPM assets.  
 
At the close of 2006, 53 percent of all PPM assets were invested in funds holding only 
equities. Only 3 percent were invested in funds holding only interest bearing investments. 
About 80 percent of the portfolio of the default fund and a large percentage of the portfolios 
of the generation funds are also invested in equities. As a result, almost 90 percent of all PPM 
assets were invested in equities at the end of 2006.  
 
At first glance, the percentage of PPM assets held in equities seems high. However, the heavy 
preference for equities is less surprising when one considers the career-age profile of PPM 
participants.  Although persons born in 1938 and later are covered in the mandatory financial 
scheme, the accounts of the older cohorts are very small. According to the transition rule for 
replacing the old system, mandatory contributions to the FDC scheme are 4/20 percent of total 
contributions for persons born in 1938, rising to 5/20 percent of total contributions for persons 
born in 1939, etc. ending with 24/24 percent of total contributions for persons born in 1954. 
With a contribution rate of 2.5 percent for the FDC scheme and with not much of a full career 
left to contribute before retirement, the relevance of this system for the overall pension of 
older participants is minimal. Hence, it’s not surprising that older cohorts tended to “take a 
gamble” and invested heavily in equities. On the other hand, the younger cohorts covered by 
the PPM scheme, born in the 1960s and later, it is in fact wise to have a large percentage of 
their portfolios invested in equities. 
 
4.4  Retirement Products 
 
The types of products that private insurance companies can provide are not explicitly 
specified in the law. Instead, they are restricted by tax regulations and court decisions. The 
Swedish market offers two classes of retirement products. The first falls under the heading of 
traditional insurance and the second is unit-linked insurance, called fund insurance in 
Sweden.
20 We have already introduced both of these. Traditional insurance is an umbrella 
term for a number of retirement products. Unit-linked products constitute the most recently 
introduced products, originating in Sweden, as we have already seen, from the mid-1990s. 
These products are described and discussed in this section. The section begins, however, with 
a discussion of the minimum age for claiming a private retirement product. 
4.4.1  Minimum Age for Claiming a Private Retirement Insurance Product 
According to the tax law, all retirement products with taxed benefits – both phased 
withdrawals over a given number of years and life annuities - can be claimed first from age 
55. This minimum age is set in legislation and has been 55 for over half a century, in spite of 
the increase in unisex longevity of persons 60 and older during the same period of around 5 
years. The age 55 rule applies in principle to individual voluntary policy holders as well as to 
occupational pension schemes. However, occupational plans can set the minimum age to 
claim a benefit at a higher age.   
 
In principle, possible retirement at 55 is not in harmony with the present goal of policy 
makers to encourage postponement of retirement in the public system to after the age of 65. 
There are powerful interests in maintaining this low age, however, represented by both 
                                                 
20 Note that mutual benefit societies cannot provide unit-linked products.   32
employee and employer confederations who see possible advantages in being able to offer a 
pension at a younger age than the minimum retirement age of 61 under the mandatory system. 
By retaining the low minimum age of 55 for claiming retirement products, policy makers 
enable early exit from the labor market financed through private saving, while maintaining a 
much higher normal pension age for the mandated public schemes, thereby not subsidizing 
early retirement of healthy workers. There is an obvious distributional aspect to this sort of 
rule, favoring the economically better off, since the lifetime poor have to wait until age 65 in 
Sweden to claim a guarantee benefit.
21    
 
Finally, in addition to individual voluntary insurance and the quasi-obligatory collective 
occupational schemes, it is possible for the employer and employee to agree on other than the 
standard retirement arrangements. Employer payments for insurance in this connection are tax 
deductible, while benefits when claimed are taxed as normal income. This option provides an 
alternative for employers to create tailored individual agreements for selected employees as 
an extra incentive in employment contracts as well as to negotiate compensation for severance 
not available in the standard collective agreement possibilities. Individual agreements falling 
under the second category can compensate for a combination of either lost earnings or lost 
pension rights in the standard schemes resulting from earlier retirement. A study of Swedish 
data by Eklöf and Halberg (2006) estimates that the probability to exit the labor force early 
would fall by 14-25 percent, depending on the year examined, if the possibility for employers 
to give a ”golden handshake” of this kind were to be eliminated.  
 
4.4.2  Insurance Products for Retirement  
 
Traditional insurance in Sweden offers lump sum payments (called kapitalförsäkring), phased 
withdrawals (temporary annuities using the Swedish terminology) and life annuities. Only 
phased withdrawals and annuities are eligible for preferential tax treatment. These, together 
with unit-linked (fund) insurance constitute the retirement products available in the Swedish 
insurance market. Table 11 summarizes the availability of the three major categories of 
retirement products within individual, occupational and public (PPM) schemes. 
 
Table 11.  Overview of products by category of provision 
 
    
 PPM Occupational Individual 
Lump-sums  No No Yes 
Phased withdrawals  No  Yes  Yes 
Annuities  Yes Yes Yes 
    
 
Individual voluntary insurance can be DB or DC. In traditional DB, the insured makes no 
investment decisions and the benefit is defined from the outset of the contract. In individual 
DC, the individual determines his/her own portfolio from a list of options during the 
accumulation phase and chooses between a traditional and a unit-linked product during the 
decumulation phase. Traditional insurance offers an annuity with a guarantee plus a bonus. 
The benefit can either be a phased withdrawal or a life annuity. By choosing a unit-linked 
annuity (phased withdrawal or life annuity) the insured determine the investment portfolio, 
                                                 
21 On the other hand, there is a positive selection of persons with low education, low income and a looser labor 
market attachment to disability take-up prior to age 65.   33
with the amount remaining on the account being distributed annually on the basis of the term 
of the contract or a life expectancy factor. 
 
Recall from the discussion above that all occupational retirement supplements under the 
ceiling are in the process of conversion to DC, as are all private sector occupational benefits 
above the ceiling. In the public sector, employees have both DC and DB supplements. Hence, 
although the entire occupational system is moving in the direction of DC commitments, the 
different sectors will arrive at different times.  At the two extremes in terms of transition 
speed are the occupational schemes for the private blue-collar workers, under the SAF-LO 
agreement, which have made a complete transition to DC and the private sector white-collar 
workers, under ITP, where, in principle, DC covers new entrants from 2007.
22 DB and DC 
products in the occupational schemes are the same as for individual insurance. Table 12 
summarizes benefits in the occupational schemes. 
 
Table 12.  Overview of DC benefit options within the occupational schemes 
 
 
 Private  blue-collar 
 (DC below and 
above ceiling) 
Private white-collar 
(DC below and 
above ceiling)
1 
Civil servants and 
other state 
employees 
DC below and DB 
above ceiling
2 
Local and regional 
government 
employees 
(DC below and DB 
above ceiling) 




Yes (5 or 10 years) 
 
Yes (5 or 10 years) 
 
Yes (5 or 10 years) 
 
Yes (5 or 10 years) 
Life Annuities  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
1 There was a DC scheme even in the previous DB regime, ITPK, based on a 2% contribution rate, which gives 
a mandatory 5 year payout from retirement.  
2 There was a DC scheme even in the previous DB regime, Kåpan, based on a 2 % contribution rate, which 
gives a mandatory 5 year payout from retirement. 
 
 
Table 13 provides a more extensive overview of all retirement products offered in Sweden, 
indicating in which context they are offered. These products are discussed under product-
category headings.  
 
Lump Sums (Kapitalförsäkring) 
 
There are three main versions of kapitalförsäkring. The first is a lump sum benefit that 
becomes available when the policy holder reaches an age specified in the policy. Premium 
payments are tax deductible up to a ceiling on the deduction and the benefit is taxed together 
with other income sources. This is a product that is only available for holders of individual 
voluntary private insurance.  
 
A second version is a lump sum benefit that becomes available to the heirs of the policy 
holder upon death of the policy holder, when death occurs during an age interval of x to y and 
where in principle x and y are determined by the terms of the contract. This insurance form 
has been attractive to persons whose purpose was to avoid creating a gift tax for a cohabitant 
or for children. From 2005 there is no longer a gift or inheritance tax, which made this saving  
 
                                                 
22 See Appendix A for details.   34


























Lump sum paid at a specific age 





















2. Temporary annuity  
 
K kronor per year is paid from a 
contracted initial age 55 + A 
during X – normally 5 or 10 – 








































3. Fixed life annuity  
 
K kronor per year is paid for the 
duration of the policy holder’s 
life. (IVI, SAF-LO, ITP, S, and 


























4. Kapitalförsäkring paid upon 
death of the policy holder 
 
Lump sum paid upon death of 
the policy holder during the age 
interval x to y. Paid to the 
survivor(s). One version allows 
a payment z years after death.  





































Unit-linked           
 
5. Variable rate annuity  
Assets are held in the fund(s) 
chosen by the individual. A new 
annual payment is calculated 





















6. Pure unit-linked  
(IVI and the Kåpan plan for  














7. Unit-linked with conversion 
to traditional fixed life at 
retirement 
((IVI, PPM, SAF-LO, ITP, S, 

















Notes. Private individual voluntary insurance is denoted as IVI. The contractual schemes are denoted by SAF-
LO, ITP, K (county council & local government.) and S (state employees). PPM denotes the PPM scheme.   35
 form less attractive. Finally, lump sum benefits for survivors are generally provided by most 
employers, in the form of group insurance. 
 
A third version of kapitalförsäkring became available from January 1, 2005, following the 
abolition of gift and inheritance taxes. This version enables the holder to place an unlimited 
sum of money into an account, which can be claimed during a period of five years from the 
age of 55. Normally, the claimants would be the policy holder’s spouse, legal cohabitant, or 
children and the aim of the policy holder would be to avoid paying the wealth tax while in 
life, while leaving the sum to these legal heirs upon death. As with the first version of this 
product, the second and third versions are available only through individual voluntary 
contracts. From February 2007 this product was taken off the market, pending a revision of 
the tax code. 
 
Phased Withdrawals and Annuities 
 
Annuities can be contracted for a fixed or lifelong payout period. A fixed-period benefit 
(temporary annuity) must be paid out during at least five years – or three years if the agreed 
period is terminated no later than age 65. Normally payments are made during a period of five 
or ten years. As we have already ascertained, the typical payout window is between the ages 
of 55 and 75, with a payout period of 5 or 10 years.  
 
A life annuity is attractive for individuals who for one reason or another believe that they will 
live longer than average and want to be certain that they will not outlive their savings. Long-
living annuitants benefit from the pooling of risks and the transfer of funds from participants 
with shorter lives. There are versions of this form of insurance where the contract is a joint 
life annuity with a spouse or legal cohabitant or where the capital of the deceased can be 
inherited upon the death of the policy holder.      
 
Life insurance can function as both longevity insurance and a survivor product for the policy 
holder, if it is claimed as a life annuity with a possible survivor benefit upon the death of the 
policy holder. A life insurance contract can allow for a payment to survivors (spouse, legal 
cohabitant, children of the policy holder) upon death of the policy holder prior to the age of 
55 and an individual longevity benefit for the policy holder from earliest age 55. In the latter 
case the survivor benefit may be terminated at some age for the policy holder beyond the age 
of 55, for example age 75. The policy holder of a product with a survivor benefit pays for this 
product by contracting a lower own life annuity for any given premium payment. 
 
Single and joint life annuities are available through individual contracts, as well as through 
individual choices in the occupational and PPM schemes. Historically, these products have 
been a part of a defined benefit package. With the transition to defined contribution, they are 
retirement products that individual financial accounts can finance.  
 
Traditional fixed-time (temporary) withdrawals or life annuity products offer a guaranteed 
rate of return and a bonus. The guaranteed rate of return, which varies between companies, 
has been between 2 and 5 percent per annum (with a rate of inflation of 1-2 percent). For 
many years it was 3 percent for all companies. The amount of the bonus, which can also be 
negative, is determined by the performance of the insurance provider’s investment portfolio. 
It is distributed to participants both during the accumulation and the decumulation phase. 
Hence, a company’s clients can benefit from successful investment performance. Both the 
guarantee and the bonus are used for marketing purposes to attract customers.    36
 
 
Unit-linked Products   
 
With unit-linked insurance the participant invests individual account balances in market funds 
during the accumulation phase. Upon retirement account balances can be converted into one 
of the insurance products already described, with the exception of a lump sum, or left in the 
individual’s account, leaving the individual to determine the investment profile of his or her 
own account. The coming year’s benefit is recalculated based on the remaining funds in the 
participant’s account at the end of each year. Here, it is also typical to offer a choice between 
a monthly payment or a single payment for the whole year. If the insured chooses a monthly 
payment, the remainder of the annual payment is invested by the insurance provider, which 
also shares this return with the customer. In practice, the customer chooses a rate of return for 
payments for the year – e.g., up to 5.5 percent given present alternatives. If the actual rate of 
return falls short of this amount, the difference is deducted from the account holder’s balance 
before calculating the payment for the next year.  
 
Within the framework of individual voluntary insurance, individuals contract with one 
insurance company. Once the individual has signed up with a company it is not possible to 
switch companies – unless switching is explicitly permitted in the contract. It is possible to 
contract with more than one company and to discontinue payments to one or more companies. 
Even in this case the minimum decumulation period is 5 years. 
 
There is a definite connection between the construction of the Swedish mandatory FDC 
scheme and the introduction of unit-linked insurance in Sweden. The design of the PPM 
system was under active consideration when unit-linked insurance was introduced in Sweden 
in 1993 and the unit-linked model soon became a model for the Swedish mandatory FDC 
scheme. 
 
Finally, whereas in the PPM system participants can move money freely between companies 
and funds during the accumulation phase, persons contracting private individual unit-linked 
insurance do not have this freedom.
23 Also, recall that in the occupational insurance 
framework, individuals select one of the companies contracted to provide products for the 
specific scheme. This reduces individual choice to around ten providers and the funds offered 
by them.    
 
4.4.3  Longevity Products and Risk 
With traditional annuity insurance the longevity risk is borne by the insurance company. Life 
annuities are the most difficult in this respect since the annuity holder can live four decades 
from age 60. In principle, individual longevity is unknown to either the insurer or the insured. 
The only information available is the life expectancy table of the whole cohort, that is, an 
estimate of the probability to survive one, two years, etc.  
 
Insurers can examine lives of persons who claim life annuities ex post in order to determine 
the correct life expectancy to be used in computing the annuity. The problem here is, of 
course, that known outcomes based on the lives of the older scheme participants may not 
present a reliable picture of coming outcomes for younger participants. Ex ante information is 
                                                 
23 The possibility of introducing this option was on the political agenda at the time of this writing, however.   37
uncertain by definition. Trends in population mortality are, however, more reliable and can 
provide guidance when insurance longevity experience is revised. The most recent revision in 
the Swedish life tables dates from 2007, replacing tables originating from 1990, which had 
become outdated especially for older ages.  
 
To the extent people have grounds to believe they will live a shorter or longer life than 
average, they would choose between 5 and 10 year withdrawals or life annuities on the basis 
of this information. Information asymmetry can give rise, thus, to adverse selection. If the 
insurer has information - or perhaps just a belief - that his clients will live longer than the 
normal population, life annuities will be priced higher to compensate for this profile.  
 
There is no statistical evidence on the distribution of motives for claiming a 5 or 10 year 
payment period, although this would certainly be interesting to study. Nevertheless, it seems 
safe to assume that the demand for withdrawals for periods shorter than a whole life is largely 
driven by the desire to supplement income in the earlier years of retirement rather than 
adverse selection. Yet, insurers are certainly wise to assume that adverse selection is present 
to some extent, since this is the result of individuals looking after their own interests. Note 
that the PPM offers only a life annuity to all participants. This eliminates the possibility of 
adverse selection, and all other things equal, makes a higher annuity payment possible for 
persons with longer lives, albeit at the expense of persons who have good reason to believe 
that their lives will be shorter than normal.  
 
Finally, we can note that the PPM offers a voluntary survivor benefit during the accumulation 
phase. The PPM cannot require medical information so it cannot judge individual risks. Since 
the PPM actuaries believe this product is chosen by persons who have reason to believe they 
will have shorter than normal lives the price for this product is higher than it would be if the 
actuaries believed that the subscribers were from the “normal” population. This is a clear 
illustration of an insurer’s caution given the risk of adverse selection. If it becomes known 
that persons with high risks are disproportionately represented in the insurance collective – or 
simply if it is rumored – and that the insurer prices thereafter, then informed low risk persons 
will avoid this insurance product, leading to a potential spiral of price increases that lead to 
greater avoidance, etc. Obviously, the way to combat this sort of process and still retain the 
insurance is to either require medical examinations that allow the pricing of risks in 
accordance with relevant risk information or to create a large randomly chosen population, for 
example by making the insurance mandatory.    
 
4.5  Final Remarks 
 
In sum, the private insurance market in Sweden is dominated by seven of the over forty 
insurance providers. Three of these companies are owned by three of the largest banks.  These 
are the major actors in the provision of both individual voluntary and occupational group 
insurance. In 2006, the market value of the total assets of private individual and contractual 
insurance for retirement equaled 80 percent of GDP and total premium payments were 6.8 
percent of GDP.   
 
The seven largest private insurance providers are also the main managers of the PPM funds. 
In 2007, they managed 43 percent of all PPM assets and owned 70 percent of the 50 largest 
funds registered in the PPM scheme. The public default (Seventh AP) fund managed another 
29 percent of assets, so, together eight companies managed about 72 percent of total PPM   38
assets. As has already been noted, the PPM changed its permissible fee schedule in 2007, 
taking advantage of this fact. Prior to this switch, permissible fees were based on the PPM 
assets held by individual funds. After the switch the permissible fee is based on the fund 
managing company’s total holdings of PPM assets. This dominance is nevertheless not widely 
known in either the domestic – or external - discussion of the PPM fund alternatives. Instead, 
the usual critique is that there are far too many funds, driving up the costs of administration.  
If PPM participants remain loyal to a selection of funds offered by these major companies, 
with the growth of assets in the PPM system the dominance of the major managing companies 
and funds managed by these companies will continue to drive down the administrative costs – 
given the PPM fee schedule.   
 
This chapter has also surveyed insurance products for retirement in Sweden. The Swedish 
market for traditional retirement products provides lump sums, withdrawals that can be taken 
over a period of 5 or 10 years, and life annuities. There are no data on the exact distribution of 
insurance products among current retirees, as was discussed already in Chapter 3 of this 
study. Nevertheless, existing data reveal that the most utilized forms are 5 or 10 year 
withdrawals.  
 
PPM retirement products, which by law are supplied only by the PPM, are restricted to life 
annuities. The interesting question is whether these annuities will be supplied by the private 
market sometime in the future. Furthermore, the present slate of private retirement product 
options has remained relatively unchanged for decades. The major newcomer is unit-linked 
insurance, which enables the client to determine his or her own portfolio during the payout or 
decumulation phase. What remains in this context is to offer product types with more degrees 
of freedom during the decumulation phase, for example the choice of moving from a variable 
to a fixed annuity with age. 
 
Finally, generally speaking, the large-scale conversion from DB to DC schemes in the recent 
decade has the effect of decreasing the longevity risk for the insurer. In principle, this should 
lead to more money’s worth in the annuity market as time progresses and the annuity market 
grows.                      
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5  MANAGEMENT OF RISKS AND SUPERVISION 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This section of the study begins with a brief description of the portfolio regulations for 
Swedish insurance companies. The portfolios of insurance providers are examined against the 
background of the regulations governing their composition. Then, given this background, risk 
management and supervision are discussed.  
 
5.2  Portfolio Regulations for Life Insurance Companies 
 
There are regulations for companies providing life and pension insurance regarding the 
portfolio composition of the reserves that cover guaranteed insurance commitments, i.e., 
liabilities taking the company’s guarantee rate of return into consideration. Prior to 2006, 
reserves were allowed to consist of up to 25 percent equities, an additional 25 percent in real 
estate, 10 percent in lending with other securities than real estate, and a maximum of 3 
percent in cash. The remainder of the portfolio was to be held in bonds, with a possible 
maximum portfolio bond content of 100 percent. From 2006, more flexible investment rules 
are applied to the part of the business providing occupational pension plans. As a result of EU 
legislation, this part of the business is subject to a prudent person approach. These reserves 
are called technical reserves. Companies are free to invest all reserves in excess of these 
technical reserves without additional regulation, but following prudent investment policy.  
 
Liquidation of a company presents a special problem, however, and according to EU 
legislation, the home country is responsible for determining the procedure to be applied in 
these cases. According to Swedish rules, in the case of liquidation, participants have the right 
to all technical reserves – corresponding at least to their premium payments, and the right to 
other reserves after deduction of other debts, for example unpaid wages and salaries of 
employees. A minimum solvency requirement for life insurance companies has been 
established by the European Union, which from 2002 is 3 million euro.  
 
Finally, even the legislation regarding investment funds is important in the unit-link context. 
In unit-link insurance individuals invest in investment funds, either owned by the insurance 
company where the individual is contracted or by other fund managers, whose funds are open 
to choice within the contract.  For an investment fund to operate in Sweden, it must adhere to 
EU rules and regulations. There are no additional rules for operation in Sweden. The specific 
requirements of the PPM for funds to join the system have already been described above. 
 
5.3  Portfolio Composition of Life Insurance Companies  
 
Table 14 shows the composition of the aggregate portfolio of private insurance companies at 
year-end from 2002 through 2006. First we note that if the assets of companies were only 
sufficient to cover technical reserves, the share of equities in total assets would be at most 25 
percent, the maximum equity portfolio content allowed in the legislation. At the end of the 
1990s, prior to the collapse of equity prices, the proportion of assets held in equities for all   40
companies together was around 50 percent. In 2002, the share of equities fell to 37 percent 
and it took until 2006 for it to once again reach 50 percent.  
 
Looking at the aggregate portfolio in a different light, the ratio of less risky assets (short-term 
paper, deposits and bonds) to riskier assets (equities, loans and real estate) was 1.26 in the 
financial “crisis” of 2002, but decreased to 0.91 by the end of 2006. From 2005, holdings of 
equities once again dominated holdings of bonds in portfolios.  
 
In traditional insurance, bonuses are distributed to policy holders when assets exceed 
liabilities. This is in fact one of the features that attract customers, and companies compete on 
the basis of the guarantee and the bonus. Prudent practice nevertheless dictates that the 
surplus should be large enough to avoid a fall below unity in the asset-liability ratio, given a 
normal corridor of variance associated with the equity content in the portfolio.  
 
 
Table 14.  Assets of life insurance companies.  Billions of kronor, year-end figures and percent of total 






















         










   of which:         
   Government  267   287   344   345  404 
   Mortgage-backed  168  199  196   198   208 
   Foreign   228   245  250   290  266 
         










   of which:         
   Noted on the Swedish exchange  163   181  202   258   291 
   Noted on foreign exchanges  183  226   275   352  396 
         










            










         
Total  1 613   1 771   1 930   2 253   2 418 
         
Short-term paper and bonds/ 










         
Of which life insurance          
(i.e. excluding non-life business)  1 281   1 443  1 567   1 833   1 979 
         
Assets in life insurance,  % GDP   54  59 61 69  70 
         
Source. Based on tables published by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority   
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Tables 15 and 16 show the ratio of assets to liabilities for a selection of private insurance 
companies. The data begin with 2002, right after the IT crash, through the third quarter of 
2007. The ratio in these tables consists of the value of assets related to both the value of 
guaranteed benefits and not yet granted (but known to policyholders) bonus components of 
liabilities. 
  
Following the dot.com crash in 2002, the ratio was under unity for all major companies, and 
significantly so for many. As a result, companies were forced in the immediately ensuing 
period to reduce bonus commitments not yet granted but known to policyholders on a 
preliminary basis. By the final quarter of 2005, the ratios of many - but not all - companies 
were comfortably above unity. Ratios leveled out thereafter through 2007, indicating that they 
had reached what companies considered to be desirable levels.   
 
Table 15.  Traditional Premium-based Insurance, with a Guarantee Ratio of Assets to Pension Liabilities.  
End of year figures. 
         
  2002 2003
*  2004* 2005** 2006** 2007
*** 
         
AMF  Pension  95  105 111 121 120 112 
Folksam  Liv  91  105 107 111 111 108 
Förenad  Liv  98  105 108 111 110  - 
KPA  Pension  91  99  100 100 100 100 
Länsförsäkringar  Liv  86  92  103 114 114 115 
Nordea Liv  89  93  99  102  -  - 
Salus Ansvar Liv  88  91  100  101  103  103 
SEB Trygg Liv, Old  88  95  106  117  122  122 
SEB Trygg Liv, New  94  99  101  102  100  98 
Skandia  Liv  88  93  101 109 112 114 
SPP  Liv  97  91 94 98  -  - 
Weighted  Average  91  96  104 113 115 112 
         
 
*December
 ** Fourth quarter 
***Third quarter  “-“ Indicates the business has been merged with another company.   
Source. Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority 
 
 
Table 16.  Occupational Defined Benefit
1 Insirance Ratio of Assets to Pension Liabilities.   
End of year figures. 
 
         
  2002 2003
*  2004* 2005** 2006** 2007
*** 
Alecta  113  120 128 128 144 164 
AMF  Pension  95  124 137 150 144 156 
KPA  Pension  91  92  101 108 106 102 
SEB Trygg Liv, New  94  93  100  -  -   
Skandia  Liv  88  105 112 123 156 175 
SPP  Liv  97  111 110 113  -  - 
Weighted  Average    119 126 129 143 161 
         
 
1Where the benefit is defined as a percentage of the worker’s salary. 
*December
 ** Fourth quarter 
***Third quarter  “-“ Indicates business has been taken over by other companies.   
Source. Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority 
 
The financial picture for occupational insurance (Table 16) resembled that of individual 
voluntary insurance in 2002. With the exception of one company, Alecta, long-term pension   42
liabilities, including not-yet granted bonuses, were greater than the current market value of 
assets at the end of the financial crisis. Recovery began in 2003 and by 2004 margins were 
again over unity. By the end of 2005 asset-liability ratios were in some cases significantly 
over unity, but nevertheless continued to climb through 2007.   
 
Summing up, taken together, these tables illustrate how Swedish companies manage their 
portfolios within the framework of the legislation regulating their business.
24 Although the 
procedure of distributing surpluses is straightforward for insurance specialists, the fact that a 
certain proportion of bonuses previously given had to be “cancelled” with the dramatic fall in 
the equity market right after the turn of the century attracted considerable attention in the 
mass media and led to a questioning of this procedure. To date, however, there is no 
indication that it will be abandoned. In fact, instead, the system proved itself to be resilient, 
returning to normalcy within the short period of 3-4 years. 
 
5.4  Risk Management in Private Individual and Occupational Group Insurance  
  
The change from a predominantly DB to a predominantly DC environment that has taken 
place from the mid-1990s has implications for the distribution of the longevity and investment 
risks between plan participants and insurance providers. Within the framework of risk 
bearing, the major difference between DC and DB is that, whereas the provider bears both the 
investment and longevity risks from the point of new entrance of a participant until death in 
the DB framework, in the DC framework the longevity and investment risks do not come into 
the picture for the provider until it is time to compute the annuity. Instead, the risks during the 
accumulation phase are borne by the participant, who manages this risk by making primarily 
decisions concerning how savings are to be invested, given the degrees of freedom offered 
within the institutional framework. In the following we consider the longevity and investment 
risks in the DC environment in more detail.  
 
5.4.1  The Investment and Longevity Risks  
Here, we consider the longevity and investment risks for private insurers, beginning with the 
investment risk. The investment risk is a function of the volatility of the investment 
portfolio’s composition. We can begin with an example using Tables 15 and 16, which 
illustrate the investment risk of Swedish insurance companies in the light of the volatile 
equity market during 2002-2005. Data for the occupational  AMF scheme illustrate how 
dramatically the ratio of assets to pension liabilities can change within a short time span if the 
insurer’s portfolio has a large equity content. In the fourth quarter of 2002, following the 
extreme drop in equity prices of around 40 percent on the Swedish stock market, AMF’s ratio 
of assets to pension liabilities fell below the threshold of unity to 95 percent. The market 
recovered in the following two years, and by the fourth quarter of 2005 the asset-liability ratio 
had rebounded to 150. AMF’s asset-liability ratio for private individual insurance also fell to 
95 percent, but with a lower rebound to 121 percent, reflecting a different portfolio profile.  
 
More generally, in assessing the investment risk it is important to recall that, in a DB plan, a 
unit of contributions will be in a pension scheme a long period of time. This time matches the 
                                                 
24 Note that even the new NDC system in Sweden follows this adjustment framework, at least in principle, 
although to date there is no legislation governing the adjustment of surpluses.    
   43
money-weighted average of time during the working career of participants plus the money-
weighted average time in retirement before the unit of contributions has to be paid out as a 
pension benefit. For Sweden, this time is estimated to be around 32 years.
25 Seen in this 
perspective, it would be wrong for funds not to hold a large share of equities, since the 
duration of time until a unit of contributions has to be paid out is so long. This way of looking 
at things justifies a large equity content in insurance company portfolios. 
 
Since a large proportion of the assets in Swedish insurance portfolios is invested in equities, 
volatility of asset values is higher than it would be with a larger share of interest bearing 
assets. On the other hand, historically, Swedish government bonds have had a return of 
around 3 percent compared with a return of 8 percent for equities listed on the Swedish Stock 
Exchange (Frennberg and Hansson 1995). Hence, the historical data indicate that it is to the 
advantage of plan participants to have as large an equity component in insurance portfolios as 
possible.  
 
The Swedish law regulating investments of insurance companies is designed to be cautious 
for the basic commitments of the plan – the guaranteed benefits – but to leave freedom for 
investments for the remainder of assets. In principle, providers are obliged to pay the 
guaranteed benefits they have promised. In addition, companies can provide higher bonus-
adjusted benefits when asset portfolios perform well – but if the ratio of assets to pension 
liabilities threatens to fall below unity - or does so – insurance providers must reduce the 
bonus in order to bring the asset-liability ratio back to a level greater than unity. In this 
framework, which is the normal framework for private individual voluntary insurance in 
Sweden, the insurance provider bears the risk for meeting the guarantee level of benefits. 
There is no risk involved per se in the bonus, however, other than an image risk if the 
company must cancel part of a previously announced bonus. Insurers bear the investment and 
longevity risks of the guaranteed benefits, but these risks are shared among annuitants in the 
case of bonuses.   
 
In DC schemes of unit-linked type, the individual bears the entire investment risk during the 
accumulation phase. In addition, if the capital of the deceased during the accumulation period 
is simply inherited by specified survivors, neither is there a longevity risk for the insurer 
during this phase. With DC the insurer’s period of uncertainty regarding the investment and 
longevity risks is, then, the much shorter annuity period. From this point, however, the risks 
for the insurance provider are ostensibly the same for DC and DB. The difference is that in 
DB a promise will usually have been made to the participant several decades earlier when 
he/she became a new entrant. Hence, whereas the insurer’s hands are not bound in DC at the 
point of granting the annuity, they are bound by a contractual agreement made early in the 
worker’s career in DB.  
 
The guarantee-bonus system does not alter the risks. What it does do is to provide a flexible 
framework for managing them. The guarantee is a commitment to be fulfilled, while the 
outcomes for investments and mortality contribute to determining the bonus. The “bonus” 
provides the insurer with extra degrees of freedom. It is a convenient mechanism for 
absorbing miscalculations in longevity and for letting the overall result reflect the 
development of the market. The more risk-averse insurer will, thus, set a conservative 
guarantee and hope to compensate with a generous bonus. In a not-for profit setting the 
distribution between the guarantee and the bonus may be more of theoretical interest if all 
                                                 
25 This is based on estimates performed for the NDC scheme, given current labor market and retirement patterns.   44
surpluses are distributed to the participants anyway. In a profit setting, however, at least in 
principle, there is an incentive to maximize both the guarantee-plus-bonus through investment 
strategy – to attract customers – and enhance profits to reward owners.        
 
Within the DC framework it is possible for participants to continue to hold their accounts in 
funds they choose themselves during the annuity phase. This option is available in all three 
insurance “categories” in Sweden: private voluntary, private occupational and public PPM 
insurance. The product is a unit-linked annuity, where funds on the individual’s account are 
distributed yearly using a divisor based on cohort life tables or simply on the remaining 
number of contractual payments. The participant’s investment strategy determines the amount 
left on account at the end of each period, to which the annuity divisor is applied. This product 
frees the insurance company from the investment risk. Neither is there a longevity risk for the 
insurer in the life annuity case, as there will always remain a fraction of an account balance to 
be paid out in the future, for any given life table. Without a survivor benefit, these remaining 
positive balances will be transferred to the insurer, with the possibility of distributing them to 
designated survivors and surviving plan participants or retaining them in the business. 
 
In the case of phased withdrawals for 5 or 10 years, which are presently widely used in 
Sweden, the insurer is also largely freed from all risk. The individual participant takes on the 
investment risk, while the longevity period is essentially known. When unused account 
balances are distributed as a contracted survivor benefit, remaining risks depend on the terms 
set out in the survivor contract.   
 
In mutually owned (not for profit) occupational schemes it is the employer who ostensibly 
bears the risk during the annuity period – in either the DB or DC case (where the annuity is 
tantamount to a defined benefit). The employer takes on the role of the owner of the insurance 
company since employers are obliged to transfer capital to a plan in financial difficulty. The 
employer’s financial obligation is only ostensible, however, since a need to provide additional 
capital at the expense of profits can be passed on to concurrent workers in the form of lower 
future wage increases. In addition, the bonus mechanism provides considerable opportunity to 
absorb risk, probably freeing the owners from ever having to provide fresh capital, except in 
the most extreme of situations. A similar risk is borne by employers who retain capital 
commitments, taking out credit insurance with the insurer FPG. 
 
According to information from the FSA, all Swedish insurance companies, with the exception 
of one (Alecta), use essentially the same life tables. This means investment portfolios 
constitute the main means for competition. Life tables used by Swedish insurers are based on 
cohort projections computed in 1985 by the Swedish Insurance Federation, revised in 1990 
and 2007. Annuity conversion factors may eventually have been systematically overstated 
through an underestimate of increasing longevity, if companies adhered strictly to the 1990 
tables for 17 years. This could have been the case, especially for the older elderly. In the end, 
all other things equal, this affects the bonus. What determines the actual outcome is 
nevertheless information that is not revealed to the public. 
 
In sum, de facto, the insured bears the longevity risk, either through conservatively chosen life 
expectancy factors used in computing annuities or through the size of the bonus actually 
granted – or both. If participants were aware of the exact annuity products they were 
purchasing or could shop around to purchase annuities, all other things equal, they would 
choose the company offering the best annuity, which is tantamount to the company willing to 
take on a larger risk, instead of passing it on to the insured. In a truly competitive annuity   45
market, this would lead to the highest affordable annuity values for annuity purchasers. The 
all other things equal caveat includes the investment performance of the provider. A major 
question is, what latitude should there be or can there be for competition through investment 
portfolios? This brings us to the issue of the matching asset. 
 
5.4.2  The “Matching Asset”  
 
A way to manage the investment risk would be to match a birth cohort’s annuity pool to a 
financial instrument with at least the same duration as the cohort’s life expectancy at 
retirement – or perhaps longer, for example, until most in the cohort have passed away. If the 
financing of a retired birth cohort’s pooled annuity is matched by an asset with a period of 
duration (roughly) commensurate to the longevity of the cohort, then the investment risk is 
minimized or perhaps eventually eliminated. In practice this requires the regular issuance of 
bonds with a duration of approximately 20 years - or more, depending on what percentage of 
a birth cohort the insurer wants to cover “risk free”. The government is the logical issuer of 
such bonds.
26 Whether it is in the interests of the country’s taxpayers to issue such bonds is an 
important issue. We can note that an alternative vehicle with a similar purpose, but not yet 
well-established in Sweden, is mortality bonds. 
 
The expected length of retirement of Swedish cohorts born in the 1950s-1970s is 18-20 years 
at age 65. The average length of a commitment for insurance companies is slightly longer - 22 
years (FSA 2004) - since the average retirement age of a covered participant is under 65. The 
bonds with the longest duration issued in Sweden since the mid-1990s are two separate issues 
of 16-17 years, one in 1997 and the other in 2004, for 40 and 64 billion kronor, respectively 
(Table B7 in the appendix). These are not typical bonds in the Swedish market, however.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, government bond issues in Sweden are typically 10-year issues for 
amounts of 40 billion kronor. The requirement to hold bonds to back guarantee commitments 
in Swedish insurance creates a strong link between the insurance business and the 
government, one that is easily taken for granted. The dimension of this link can be illustrated 
as follows. In March 2008 the Swedish government’s entire debt was 1075 billion kronor 
(about 35 percent of GDP) of which about 500 billion kronor is financed with Swedish 
government bonds. Roughly 60 percent of the total stock of government bonds is held by the 
private insurance companies administering the individual voluntary and occupational 
schemes. 
 
In 2006-2007, the money weighted coupon rate of the stock of government bonds was around 
5 percent, a rate which is sufficient to cover the most ambitious guaranteed rate of return 
offered by Swedish providers of individual voluntary insurance. In addition, with a rate of 
inflation of 1.5 percent per annum over the entire period since the Central Bank converted 
from a fixed to a floating exchange rate in 1992 this indicates a real coupon rate of return of 
around 3.5 percent. This is more than sufficient to maintain balance in the voluntary portion 
of the insurance business where a nominal guarantee rate of 3 percent is typical. In addition, it 
is sufficient to maintain a bonus rate comparable to a price indexed annuity in the present 
contractual DB schemes, given that the longevity risk has been properly managed. 
 
                                                 
26 Whether it is in the interests of the country’s taxpayers to issue these matching assets purely for the purpose of 
insurance providers is an important issue that must be addressed for those who promote this approach.       46
Note that the 10-year government bond rate, shown in Figure 3, fell to a low approaching 3 
percent in mid-2005. Since most insurance providers in Sweden discount liabilities with a rate 
of 3 percent, examination of Figure 3 shows that for a short period in 2005 there was a 
possibility that the market rate for 10-year bonds had come close to falling below the rate 
used for discounting liabilities, and, in fact, did so for the few companies using a discount rate 
of 3.5 percent.    
 
Figure 3.  10-year government bond rate 
Monthly values, January 1987-March 2008 
Figure 3. 10-year government bond rate











































































































Source. The Swedish National Debt Office   
 
 
An interesting question in this context is what happens to competition among annuity 
providers if the whole insurance market has access to and holds long bonds with the same 
returns. Logically, an investment portfolio that provides a good longevity match between 
assets and liabilities will inevitably restrict competition among insurance companies. The 
counterfactual is a situation with portfolios with higher equity content and higher rates of 
return for customers, but also with more volatility and risk. It can be concluded that present 
Swedish practice enables companies to assume greater risks – and for  annuity recipients to 
achieve higher returns - than would be the case if annuity liabilities were more or less exactly 
matched by long bonds with a duration close to the longevity of annuities.       
 
Finally, we note that periods with falling interest rates have two effects on the portfolios of 
insurance companies. The first is that a lower discount rate increases the present value of a 
company’s commitments. As a consequence, the required technical insurance reserve, that is 
bond content, also increases. Second, companies’ bond portfolios increase in value as coupon 
rates fall, but this increase will not match the increase in liabilities to the insured. This is a 
result of the fact that liabilities have a longer duration than assets. The average duration to 
maturity of government bonds has been around 4 to 5 years
27, whereas the average duration to 
                                                 
27 The duration of the stock of government bonds is 5.5 years, calculated from Table B7 in the appendix. The 
duration of treasury bills is around a year. The data indicate debt rolls over completely about every four years.  
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maturation of insurance commitments (which for individual voluntary insurance can start at 
age 55) is much longer.  
 
In closing, it can be noted that, compared for example with the UK where there is a lively 
public discussion of the need for long-term government debt issuance to create the “matching 
asset” for private insurance, there is presently little discussion of this issue in the Swedish 
insurance community. Instead, insurance companies seem to be comfortable dealing with the 
risk of fluctuating values in asset portfolios through the system of balancing with (positive – 
and when necessary – negative) bonuses, described above. In addition, as the data above 
indicate, especially the occupational schemes, which dominate the private market, are 
presently running with considerable surpluses, suggesting the companies have successfully 
managed the investment volatility. In retrospect we can see that a major consequence of the 
dot.com financial crisis of 2001-2002 was development and implementation of a new regime 
for measuring portfolio stress potential, which will be discussed below under the topic of 
regulation and supervision.   
 
5.5  PPM Product Provision and Risk Management  
 
We turn now to the PPM. As has already been discussed, the PPM is the sole provider of 
annuity products in the mandatory financial account scheme. The products that the PPM can 
provide are specified in law. Participants can choose between single and joint life annuities. 
Life annuities, which can be either fixed or variable rate, are the only products offered. Hence, 
product choice is limited in the mandatory plan, compared with individual and occupational 
insurance.   
 
A fixed rate annuity is “purchased” from the PPM at retirement and entails closing individual 
accounts and transferring money to the PPM, which invests the funds. This is the PPM 
equivalent to the traditional insurance alternative within the private insurance framework, 
which provides a combination of a guarantee and a bonus rate of return. Alternatively, the 
participant can leave his/her money in market funds and accept a recalculated annuity on an 
annual basis. This is the variable rate annuity, which is a unit-linked annuity. These annuities 
are also managed by the PPM.  
 
Until April 2007, the guaranteed rate of return was 2.75 percent. In a series of steps during 
2007, the PPM changed its policy both regarding the guarantee and how the funds of 
pensioners should be invested. In order to enable it to increase its solvency ratio and thereby 
invest a greater portion of assets in equities, the guarantee was changed to cover only the 
nominal value of individual balances, i.e. the guaranteed rate of return was lowered to 0 
percent. This means that the entire return will be viewed as a “bonus” – or profit-sharing 
segment of investment returns. It is hoped that this policy will give a better return to policy 
holders in the long run.    
 
The choice of investment service provider(s) is made by the PPM's Board of Directors. 
Money turned over to the PPM at retirement is invested by a public investment company. For 
the past several years, 73 percent of the assets of annuity holders have been invested in 
interest bearing assets and 27 percent in equities. As has already been discussed, by law 
insurance companies can have a distribution of 75/25 in their technical reserves, but the PPM 
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is allowed a 70/30 distribution. The share of equities represents, thus, what is allowable while 
complying with the rules regarding technical reserves. The PPM is not yet in the position 
where it has “free assets”, that is, reserves much exceeding the amount needed to cover 
guaranteed commitments, which it can invest more freely.
28 At year’s end 2007, following the 
switch from a guarantee rate of return of 2.75 percent on balances to a guarantee covering 
only the nominal value of balances, the solvency ratio increased from a little over unity - 1.04 
– to about 1.17. Progressively during 2007 the PPM enlisted the services of four private firms 
to manage an equity portfolio. Its interest bearing portfolio is still being managed by a 
publicly owned investment agency that invests other government funds.   
 
Benefits are calculated using unisex life expectancy tables, which is in line with an EU court 
(Barber) decision regarding benefit calculations in public  pension schemes. The life 
expectancy projections used by the PPM are taken from Statistics Sweden’s projections. 
Statistics Sweden provides two scenarios: a baseline and a low mortality rate scenario.  In 
calculating the traditional fixed-rate annuity, the model with a guarantee and a bonus, the 
PPM uses Statistics Sweden’s low mortality scenario, adjusted even further by assuming 
mortality will be 10 percent lower. On the other hand, the baseline scenario is used in 
calculating the variable rate annuity, where the participant retains his or her market funds.  
The difference between the low mortality scenario and the baseline scenario is substantial, 
about four years to the year 2050 (Table17). Hence, the PPM fixed rate annuity is based on a 
very conservative assumption. 
 
Table 17.  The PPM Life Expectancy Assumption.  Illustrated with LE from birth. 
 
  2004 2050 
Baseline scenario 
Men 77.9  83.6 
Women 82.3  86.2 
Low mortality scenario 
Men 78.0  87.5 
Women 82.4  89.9 
Source. Statistics Sweden 
 
Whereas in the fixed-rate case the PPM bears the longevity risk for the guaranteed benefits, 
the PPM bears no longevity risk for the variable rate. From the point of view of the insured 
individual who has chosen the variable rate option (which around 90 percent of retired 
participants had in 2007) this allows use of the less conservative mortality assumption and 
results in less money in the final years of the payout period. For present pensioners, benefits 
are still so small that this makes little difference in practice. It will become a matter for 
potential concern when the PPM system has matured and individual balances at retirement are 
large enough to worry about. 
 
Presently, the PPM expects to retain the mortality schedule, determined at age 65, for the 
remainder of the participant’s life. There is nothing that prohibits changing tables in the 
future, if longevity changes considerably compared with the table values. Within the 
traditional insurance framework, as has already been discussed at length, the insurer, the PPM 
in this case, has the option of covering negative longevity outcomes for the insurer by altering 
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the bonus and then setting a new divisor value for newly granted benefits. This is an option 
available to both the PPM and private insurers.  
 
There is one issue that is not clear in the Swedish legislation, which is the question of owner 
liability. Although the PPM’s life expectancy assumptions appear to be very conservative, it is 
still theoretically possible that life expectancy could outperform this conservative value and/or 
that portfolio investment performance would not be sufficient to cover the guaranteed 
liability. Swedish law prohibits distributing money between cohorts to cover a deficit for any 
given cohort. In principle, the Swedish government is the owner of the plan administered by 
the PPM, which implies that the government would be responsible for covering any deficit 
that may occur, although this is not stated specifically in the law. 
 
In sum, the set-up for the PPM is similar to that for private individual voluntary insurance, 
with the exception that the choice of retirement products is considerably more limited.  
 
5.6  Regulation of Providers of Insurance Products  
 
5.6.1  Regulatory Procedures 
 
Regulation of banking, insurance and the securities market are all under one roof in Sweden – 
the Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen), referred to as the FSA from here 
on. The FSA is a public agency. The integration into one supervisory agency is logical, given 
the development of the financial markets during the past two decades, with integration of 
insurance into banking and vice versa. The planning and execution of supervision is 
performed jointly for all financial entities.  
 
The Financial Supervisory Authority grants the right to establish and operate a financial 
company in Sweden. From 1999 foreign-based companies can operate in Sweden without 
establishing a registered company, by registering with the FSA. The government sets the 
framework of principles for operation in Sweden, following EU legislation and regulations.         
 
Quarterly and annual reports, special questionnaires, on-site inspections and market and 
specific company analysis provide the basis for supervision. Generally, the focus of 
supervision is on solvency. Traditionally, quarterly information is processed to examine 
premium receipts, benefit payments, portfolios, etc. in order to determine the vulnerability of 
assets and liabilities to market risks. Table 10 above is based on a selection of this 
information. From 2006 the FSA has introduced a new supervisory instrument, called the 
traffic light system, which is designed to provide an early warning signal of the market risks 
implicit in the asset portfolios of life insurance companies. This is described in greater detail 
in a separate section below. 
 
Generally speaking, insurance companies are regarded by the FSA as presenting much less of 
a systemic stability risk than banks. This is because banks must match liquid liabilities 
(deposits) with relatively illiquid assets (loans). A rapid fall in deposits is difficult to meet 
with an immediate adjustment in the stock of loans. The situation is just the opposite for 
insurance companies, which manage relatively liquid assets that need to match illiquid 
liabilities. 
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The FSA summarizes its supervisory role with the following picture. 
 
Table 18.  The FSA’s Supervisory Role. 
 
  System functionality  Consumer protection 
 
Supervision of system stability  Focus: Supervision of companies’ 
management, financial strength 
and risk management, etc. to 
ensure operational stability and 
adequate risk management.     
Focus: Provision of products with 
transparent product contents and 
descriptions that ensure that 
commitments to customers can be 
understood and met.   
Supervision of the market  Focus: Supervision of how 
financial actors perform 
independently and together with 
the aim of ensuring market 
efficiency and public confidence in 
the market. 
Focus: Correct and relevant 
information and fair treatment of 
customers. 
Source. FSA 2004. 
  
The FSA intervenes in the operations of a company if two criteria are met. First, there must be 
an impending situation or risk that the market can not handle satisfactorily on its own. 
Second, the benefits of an intervention must be considered to outweigh the market efficiency 
loss implicit in an intervention.  
 
In the supervision of insurance companies, the first question asked is whether the company’s 
survival is in danger and whether there is a risk that payments must be cancelled. If the 
answer is affirmative then the FSA will interact with the company to achieve a solution to the 
problem. If there is a systemic risk, which is not an immediate solvency problem, the FSA 
will initiate procedures for restructuring of the company – if this has not already happened 
through the initiative of the company itself. This is likely to result in a change of ownership 
through merger or takeover. An immediate solvency problem will require the intervention of 
Ministry of Finance and recapitalization through injection of government funds. In principle, 
this rule should even hold for the PPM, although this is not explicitly stated in the law, as has 
already been mentioned. 
 
5.6.2  Determination of Solvency 
 
An insurance company is considered solvent if  
 
1)  capital base ≥ 4% of technical reserves for policies where the company bears the 
financial risk + 1 % of technical reserves for other policies + an amount related to mortality 
risk exposure; and if  
2)  capital base essentially = Value of market assets – Technical insurance reserves, 
with deduction of intangible assets and addition of subordinated loans. 
 
The technical reserves are the reserves needed to cover the current guaranteed liabilities to 
pensioners.
29  
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The capital base (expression 2) increases in a rising market and falls in a declining market. 
Likewise, ceteris paribus, an increase in technical insurance reserves decreases the capital 
base. In practice, companies can choose freely any discount rate up to a ceiling established by 
the FSA. According to an EU regulation the ceiling is 60 percent of the market rate for long 
government bonds. If the discount rate falls, then solvency falls with it in the case that 
companies are forced to use a lower rate due to the fall. An increase in the discount rate 
increases solvency.  
 
Prior to 2007, the market rate used by the FSA to establish the ceiling was the rate on the 
longest government bond on the market. In 2006 this was a bond issued in 2004, maturing in 
2020 and carrying a 5 percent coupon. This gave a ceiling of 3 percent for the discount rate. 
Preceding this, there was a lower rate based on a bond with a shorter maturity of 11 years. 
Although market rates began to rise in 2005, the 16-year bond nevertheless remained as the 
measuring rod for establishing the ceiling. According to its stated policy, the FSA will change 
this rate only when there is sufficient evidence for doing so. 
 
It is interesting to note that in mid-2003, following the fall in the stock market, the solvency 
ratio, calculated with reference to guaranteed benefits, for the largest thirteen companies was 
still relatively high – at 8.7 - and by mid-2004 it had improved by even more, reaching 9.7 
(FSA 2004). These are high figures compared with an intervention level of unity. This 
indicates that, even in the worst years, solvency remained relatively high, even though many 
companies were compelled to take back previously committed bonuses, as a response to the 
fall in the equity market, as has been discussed above. However, for one of the largest 
insurance companies, SPP, the ratio was only 1.18 in late 2004, and it was below 2 for two 
other relatively large companies. As a result, the FSA required more and more frequent 
information from these companies during the crisis period. 
 
Companies that come close to the insolvency level lose considerable potential to invest in 
equities when the market turns up, putting them in a worse situation to compete with other 
providers. In fact, the companies that were close to the solvency level after the fall in the 
equity market in the initial years of the new century, and which were forced to reduce bonuses 
to savers and pensioners, were “punished” by a fall in business in 2004. For example, SPP’s 
sales of new voluntary insurance fell by 65 percent from mid-2003 to mid-2004 (FSA 2004). 
   
An important question recently debated in the insurance community in Sweden is what should 
be the discount rate applied to determine the value of technical liabilities? Until 2007, the 
choice was left up to the individual insurance company, albeit with a ceiling, as we have just 
seen. This meant that companies choosing a higher rate had a smaller liability and more room 
for free investments. In addition, the FSA has observed that some companies used a higher 
rate than the reigning rate on government bonds during 2006. The FSA responded by issuing 
a new regulation at the end of 2006.  This regulation requires companies to use a “risk free” 
discount rate from 2007. The rate used is to be an average of the rate of return on government 
bonds and the swap rate, the latter is included to extend the portfolio of instruments upon 
which the discount rate is based.  
 
One of the arguments used in issuing this new regulation was that it is important for all 
companies to use the same rate, which among other things facilitates comparability, although 
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at the expense of leaving the freedom to choose an even lower rate. If the aim, in addition to 
specifying a risk free rate, were for all companies to use exactly the same rate, then it would 
be practical for the FSA to compute this rate and inform all companies of the resultant value. 
Instead, the FSA has left it up to the individual company to calculate this risk free rate, which 
in practice opens the door to some variation depending on the method of calculation used. 
Since this procedure is in conflict with the FSA’s specified goal, it seems reasonable to 
predict that this procedure is likely to be replaced by a standard calculation supplied by the 
FSA. 
 
In sum, until 2007, insurance companies, including the PPM, were free to choose a discount 
rate for liabilities with the only restriction that it should not exceed a specified ceiling. From 
2007 the rate is, in principle, the same for all companies. In principle, this assures that no 
company exceeds the risk free rate and creates inter-company comparability. On the other 
hand, it eliminates the freedom of companies to choose an even more conservative discount 
rate and in doing so goes beyond the current EU directive, which allows freedom of choice up 
to the ceiling. 
 
5.6.3  The Traffic Light System 
 
In 2006 the FSA introduced a new supervision instrument called the traffic light system, 
based on experience of the application of a similar instrument in Denmark. All insurance 
companies are covered by the traffic light system since January 2006 and the PPM is covered 
from January 2007. The traffic light system is intended to provide an advance warning of a 
company’s vulnerability before the insolvency level has been reached.  
 
The traffic light system is designed to test the stress tolerance of companies’ financial 
condition by requiring them to compute the change in the values of assets and liabilities 
resulting from hypothetical declines in interest rates and equity prices. The following 
tolerance tests are applied (FSA 2005): 
 
1.  The equity price risk is separated into a risk for domestic and foreign assets. Insurance 
companies must be able to tolerate a fall of 40 percent in Swedish and 37 percent in 
foreign equity prices. 
2.  Companies must be able to tolerate a fall of 35 percent in property values.  
3.  The foreign exchange risk that a company must be able to absorb is a 10 percent 
change in the exchange rate.    
4.  Companies are required to calculate whether their net interest exposure (the difference 
between the interest sensitivity of assets and liabilities) is long or short. For a short 
position, the company is required to calculate the effect of a fall in the rate of interest. 
For a long position, the company is required to compute the effect of an increase in the 
rate of interest. The tolerance levels tested are: 
i.  nominal SEK interest rate: +/- 30 percent of the 10 year rate 
ii.  real SEK interest rate: +/- 30 percent of the longest real interest rate 
iii.  nominal Euro interest rate: +/- 25 percent of the 10 year Euro rate 
iv.  nominal interest, other currencies: +/- 30 percent of the 10 year rate for the 
largest portfolio asset denominated in another foreign currency 
5.  Credit risk (increase in spread):  the greater of 100 percent increase or an increase of 
50 basis points 
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The net outcome is calculated as the square root of each risk raised to the power of two, 
including correlation components. Whether an insurance company receives a red or a green 
light depends on the net result of this calculation. The traffic light system is seen as a 
complement to the solvency test and the other data collection and supervisory tools used by 
the FSA. 
 
In sum, the extreme fluctuations in domestic and foreign stock markets, property values and 
interest rates during the past couple of decades, together with the increased importance of 
privately managed and provided insurance in the life portfolios of individuals, has led to the 
introduction of this much more sophisticated approach to evaluating the tolerance of 
portfolios to extreme changes in the financial environment. 
 
5.7  Final Remarks 
 
The Swedish insurance framework with a guaranteed rate of return and distribution of 
performance-based bonuses is a long-standing practice. This form of benefit is the standard 
insurance benefit within private voluntary, occupational group, and publicly provided PPM 
insurance. Looking back, this institution has never presented a serious problem for solvency, 
since the guarantee has always been relatively low compared with the market rate on 
government bonds. The convention of distributing bonuses to the insured – both during the 
accumulation and the annuity phases in the DB framework and during the annuity phase in the 
DC framework – provides an opportunity for companies to compete on the basis of 
investment performance. In principle, there should even be room for competing through 
longevity assumptions, but to date companies have tended to use the same life tables. The 
guarantee-bonus system provides some slack within which the potential problems created by 
less than certain life expectancy divisors used in computing annuities can be absorbed.  
 
The more general disadvantage of employing the guarantee-bonus model is that there is a risk 
that distributed bonuses may need to be reclaimed, even if only temporarily. The drawback is 
that reclaiming bonuses is never popular. This study has illustrated how this mechanism 
worked following the crash in the Swedish stock market in 2001-2002. Although some 
companies were forced to cancel portions of previously announced bonuses, no company fell 
into more than temporary financial difficulty. By 2005 all companies once again had 
considerable free liquidity. Nevertheless, cancelling bonuses was not popular and, at least 
temporarily, companies that did not cancel a part of a previously announced bonus gained a 
competitive edge.   
 
The financial crisis had another repercussion. In 2006, the FSA introduced the traffic light 
system to analyze the vulnerability of insurance companies to financial stress. There is little 
experience yet in applying this instrument so it is too soon to pass judgment on the effect it 
could have on the investment policies of insurance companies and, perhaps, as a consequence, 
the Swedish ”guarantee and bonus” system. On top of this, there is a new regulation from 
2007 specifying the risk free rate of return to be used for discounting liabilities as an average 
of the government bond and swap rate. The aim of this regulation is to create a comparable 
measuring rod for insurance company liabilities, which is laudable. 
 
Generally, it now appears that both product and supervisory trends are in the direction of 
decreasing risk and increasing conformity among providers. First, the conversion from DB to 
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accumulation phase. In DC, the insurance company bears the longevity and investment risks 
only during the payout phase. In Sweden, all companies use the same life tables. We have 
noted that if, as is apparently the case, all companies use the same tables to manage the 
longevity risk, this leaves only investment portfolio returns for competition. 
 
If guaranteed benefits were to be covered by say 20-30 year bonds, still not a reality in 
Sweden, then even this element of risk would be minimized, but also at the expense of 
increasing conformity among providers. More generally, in a world where the investment 
portfolios of providers contained something like birth-cohort bonds issued for more or less the 
duration of a cohort’s life, the investment risk would be minimized, creating almost complete 
uniformity between providers on this point, too. In the Swedish traditional insurance setting, 
this would put competition in the hands of investments for creating bonuses. 
 
Finally, supervisory rules are moving in the direction of creating greater conformity and 
reducing potential volatility of portfolios through the new traffic light stress test. Given that 
all companies are also restricted in their provision of insurance products to those specified in 
the legislation regulating insurance, all factors that lead towards similar investment portfolios 
tend to reduce the remaining degrees of freedom for competition. The major challenge is 
therefore to retain enough investment freedom to leave room for healthy competition and to 
encourage product innovation. 
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6  CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
Major reforms, including structural reforms of the financial market in the 1980s and the 
public pension system in the 1990s, were important prerequisites for the development of 
today’s thriving private insurance market in Sweden. The financial market reforms of the 
1980s and early 1990s did away with a regime characterized by quantitative portfolio 
investment regulations. From the point of view of private insurance, the most significant 
development was the implementation of legislation permitting unit-linked insurance in 1993. 
This made it possible to couple the emerging private investment fund market with the market 
for contractual saving.  
 
The first step in the reform of the public pension system was to abolish the pay-as-you-go 
survivor benefit for widows, beginning with women born in 1945 and later. This led to an 
immediate increase in the percentage of women purchasing private pension and life insurance 
products. Women’s demand for insurance has increased steadily since this change was 
introduced in the early 1990s. Most important, however, was the conversion of the earnings-
related public mandatory pension system from DB to DC. The transformation of the public 
commitment to a financial DC framework led to the conversion of all major occupational 
supplementary benefit schemes from predominantly defined benefit to predominantly defined 
contribution. Previously unfunded occupational schemes for public sector employees at all 
levels of government, became (largely) pre-funded. In addition, all occupational arrangements 
for private sector employees became pre-funded. This transition into increased pre-funding 
within a DC framework is by far the most important development in the Swedish pension 
landscape in the past decade.  
 
The conversion to financial DC schemes has led to a considerable injection of money into the 
Swedish financial market. PPM annual premium payments amount to just about one percent 
of GDP. Premium payments into the private voluntary and occupational schemes (and various 
other products of life and health insurance) amount to almost seven percent of GDP. This is 
significant by international standards. This is on top of a mandatory pay-as-you-go (NDC) 
scheme with a relatively fixed cost of about 11 percent of GDP. The overall Swedish 
commitment to pensions is then around 18 percent of GDP, of which about a third is pre-
funded. 
 
At 18 percent of GDP, the overall scale of pension commitments in Sweden is high. Some of 
the total commitment (included within the 11% cost for the public pay-as-you-go 
commitments) consists of transfers for the low income pension guarantee, non-contributory 
rights,  e.g., for mothers, and covered old-age rights accruing during periods of insured 
unemployment, sickness and disability. The evidence from Sweden is, thus, that it is possible 
to maintain a strong welfare commitment even with a more pronounced pre-funding profile. 
The data on expected future replacement rates for full-career workers support this conclusion. 
Although the adequacy of coverage of persons with short earnings careers is an issue for 
concern in the new DC environment, the overall picture is of a country which in aggregate 
transfers a large percentage of its income to pensioners, in part through transfers and in part 
through collective and individual saving. What is important to stress is that an increasing 
percentage will be transferred in coming decades through saving as the new financial DC 
schemes mature.   
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Furthermore, Sweden’s experience indicates that, even in the more developed economies, the 
conversion to financial pension schemes can contribute to developing the financial market. 
The financial defined contribution PPM scheme within the public mandatory system was 
modeled after unit-linked insurance, providing the opportunity for individuals to make their 
own portfolio choices during both the accumulation and payout phases. Private individual 
voluntary and occupational group insurance also offer unit-link products as an alternative to 
traditional insurance, an alternative that has become a popular product in recent years. The 
growth of the PPM and the private unit-linked market has in turn pushed the growth in the 
number of funds available in the market. At the same time the entrance of the PPM helped to 
put a focus on fund charges and, more generally, administration fees. 
 
In spite of the large number of companies now offering funds in the PPM system, this study 
reveals that the seven largest Swedish based insurance companies manage the majority of the 
PPM assets not held in the default fund. The same companies account for almost all the 
occupational and private insurance business. A conclusion is, then, that despite the large 
number of insurance companies and fund managers in the Swedish market, the market is 
dominated by only a few companies. Of course, the mere fact that there are around 40 
insurance companies and over 75 fund managers doing business in Sweden is a healthy sign 
and suggests that despite the dominance of the larger groups many companies still operate 
successful businesses within this environment. 
 
The analysis in this study of data on the sources of income of pensioners shows that both 
occupational and private insurance provide an important source of income in the earlier years 
of retirement for current pensioners. Sweden has no data on the distribution of insurance 
benefits by types of products. The aggregate data suggest, however, that 5 and 10 year 
withdrawals of occupational and private voluntary benefits are the preferred options. Also, the 
data indicate that life annuities are not important income sources for present older pensioners. 
However, this may reflect the fact that for a long time the public benefit, with an occupational 
supplement, was viewed as providing sufficient income.  
 
The demand for private insurance did not take off until around 1990, with the beginning of the 
downsizing of the public commitment – beginning with the abolition of the widow’s benefit 
for younger birth cohorts. The relatively strong increase in the demand for private insurance 
in the early 1990s may also have reflected a feeling of pessimism among younger birth 
cohorts that the public commitment would not be honored in full in the future. The reform 
legislation of the public system, moving from DB to DC, confirmed this, at least in a sense. 
Although the move to DC was more or less neutral or advantageous for a 40-year plus career 
worker, it definitely reduced commitments to participants with short earnings careers. In 
addition, it made retirement at a fixed age, the current “normal” retirement age of 65, more 
costly in terms of income replaced for successively younger birth cohorts.  
 
Overall, the succession of changes, beginning with the reform of the public system, signals a 
continued future increase in demand for private longevity insurance products, including life 
annuities. In fact, life annuities should be expected to be demanded especially by women born 
after 1945 in part due to the overall age difference between spouses and in part due to the fact 
that women live 4-5 years longer than their spouses. Within traditional insurance, the portfolio 
of products offered in the Swedish market has remained practically unchanged for over a half 
century. The major product innovation during this period was the introduction of unit-linked 
insurance, giving participants the opportunity to manage their own funds, not only during the 
accumulation phase, but even during the payout phase, with the latter resulting in a variable   57
rate annuity. The money weighted duration of the present stock of government bonds is only 
5.5 years, based on the figures in Table B7 in the statistical appendix. The turnover time for 
treasury bills is around a year. A calculation of the weighted duration of both bonds and bills 
suggests the government rolls over its debt completely about every four years.  
 
Two major issues in insurance provision are the longevity and investment risks. Clearly, a DC 
scheme shifts the investment risk during the accumulation phase to the individual. Either the 
individual chooses funds or the company which invests on his/her behalf. If the individual 
chooses to manage his or her own funds during the payout phase, with payments being 
recalculated every period (year), both the investment and longevity risks are shifted to the 
individual, since funds remaining on the account balance at the end of the year are paid out 
according to a given annuity factor. In this sense, this product form is ideal for the insurer, 
who then provides only investment fund options and earns money on charges for these 
management services. 
 
Likewise, 5 and 10 year withdrawal products eliminate the longevity risk from insurance 
companies, transferring it to workers, at least to the extent that these products are now 
coupled to a form of a survivor benefit that “reintroduces” risk. However, if the insurance 
product is a traditional insurance product, which in Sweden means that the insurance provider 
guarantees a specific rate of return, there remains an investment risk. Since 10-year bonds are 
a common form of debt finance for the Swedish government, in principle insurance 
companies have access to a “short” matching asset. Judging by the absence of a debate on this 
issue of the matching asset, Swedish insurers do not seem to miss the convenience of having a 
single matching asset. In addition, it is not clear to what extent public debt policy caters 
directly to the needs of insurance companies.   
 
The Swedish model for traditional insurance provides a guaranteed plus a bonus rate of return 
during both the accumulation and the payout phase. If the ratio of assets to pension liabilities 
– including the guarantee - goes below unity, correction entails reducing bonuses granted 
earlier. This is also the model adopted by the PPM for its traditional life annuity. The bonus is 
based to a large extent on the returns on the portion of the insurance provider’s portfolio that 
is invested in equities and, given that companies compete through bonus offerings, they are 
competing on the basis of their investment outcomes. This is a model that could be adopted in 
many other countries, whereas to date it is apparently Denmark and Sweden that employ it on 
a large scale. 
 
The guarantee-bonus system facilitates management of both the longevity and investment 
risks. Insurers bear the investment and longevity risks of the guaranteed benefits, but these 
risks are shared among annuitants in the case of bonuses, since the effects of an underestimate 
of life expectancy and volatility of investment returns can be offset by reducing the size of the 
bonus. The advantage of this system is clear. It enables the insurance company to increase the 
returns offered to participants by taking on more risk. The disadvantage is that, in the “worst” 
case, the provider must create a balance between assets and liabilities by reducing the size of 
previously announced bonuses, which can create an image problem. This feature could be 
made more transparent through clearer advance information to participants on the nature of 
the contract. On the other hand, when the market collapses participants will be aware of this 
fact, and tolerance may be higher when cutbacks can be explained as a logical result of an 
exogenous event that affects practically all investors. In the case of unit-linked annuities, 
participants bear the investment risk on an individual basis but share the longevity risk.    
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In 2006, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Agency introduced a new tool for measuring the 
degree of stress insurance portfolios can tolerate, called the traffic light system. The traffic 
light system is designed to illuminate the degree of risk in the insurance provider’s investment 
portfolio in relation to pension liabilities. In addition, whereas prior to 2007 insurance 
companies were free to choose the discount rate (up to a ceiling) applied in evaluating 
liabilities, from 2007 they must use a risk free rate determined as an average of the 
government bond and swap rates. Judging by these recent events the present trend in Sweden 
is toward creating a stricter regulatory framework, while maintaining the guarantee-bonus 
system.  
 
Summing up, there are some important lessons that can be learned from a study of 
developments in Sweden. The first is that it is fundamental that the market be free to develop, 
albeit under the supervision of a financial supervisory authority. Secondly, the development 
of financial institutions and instruments feed into each other, generally expanding possibilities 
for the development of both. Thirdly, even for a country that takes on a considerable welfare 
commitment, it is possible to build on the market to provide services for this commitment. It 
is likely that the public FDC plan in Sweden will eventually not only use the market during 
the investment phase, but also during the annuity phase, once the scale of annuities has 
become large enough to make this a reasonable step. In 2007, the first step was already taken, 
with the privatization of equity investments for the traditional insurance portfolio. In the 
meantime, with small sums of money per beneficiary it is probably to the advantage of 
pensioners that all risks are aggregated in one collective product. The public PPM-managed 
scheme follows all the rules that apply to private companies, and is subject to the same 
regulatory instruments, in principle.  
 
A fourth lesson is that the demand for annuities is related to the coverage of the public scheme 
and the public perception – or understanding – of the need to supplement the public 
commitment with private initiative. The Swedish move from DB to DC schemes helped by 
setting a ceiling on the public commitment. Fifth, the substantial move to DC and pre-funding 
in the public scheme as well as the occupational schemes for public and private sector 
employees generated greater long-run intergenerational fairness and long-run financial 
stability. 
 
One final observation is that, with the major exception of the introduction of unit-linked 
insurance, little has happened during the past half century in the development of insurance 
products. To date, the products utilized have been driven in part by a desire to utilize tax rules 
and in part by an apparent demand for complementary income for the early years of 
retirement. What remains is to develop retirement products with a focus on how the longevity 
and investment risks can be managed while offering attractive alternatives to customers.           59
Appendix A: Changes in Occupational Pension Schemes 
 
This Appendix summarizes the changes that have been effected in the benefit design of the 
main occupational pension schemes.  There are four major occupational benefit schemes in 
Sweden that together cover almost 90 percent of all employees. These provide a top-up for 
earnings covered under the ceiling in the public system and a benefit for earnings above the 
ceiling. The four schemes cover white collar workers (ITP/ITPK), blue collar workers (SAF-
LO), local government employees (KAP-KL) and national government employees (PA-03).  
 
Prior to the reform of the public pension system, beginning in 1994, all the occupational 
schemes provided defined benefits. But only the benefit plans covering white collar workers 
(ITP) were fully funded financial defined benefit (FDB) plans. The plans for workers covered 
by the SAF-LO agreement were funded at the time of retirement, while the plans for public 
sector workers were pay-as-you-go – that is, they were non-financial defined benefit (NDB) 
plans. 
 
Salaried employees in industry and commerce (ITP and ITPK) 
 
The supplementary pension scheme for salaried employees in industry and commerce (ITP 
and ITPK) provides a defined benefit scheme for employees born in 1978 and earlier (Table 
A2) and, according to an agreement reached in April 2006, a defined contribution individual 
financial account scheme for employees born in 1979 and later (Table A1).  
 
In addition to the standard ITP benefit presented in Table A1, persons born between 1939 and 
1978 are covered by an additional plan, called ITPK. This is based on a defined contribution 
of 2 percent of earnings paid from age 28 to 65. From the very outset in 1990, participants in 
ITPK have been able to choose from a list of registered insurance providers. This was in fact 
the first plan of this type in Sweden. When unit-linked insurance entered the Swedish market 
in 1993 fund choices also became a feature of this plan. There are 14 providers of unit-linked 
and 10 providers of traditional life insurance products to choose from, with most participating 
companies providing both. 
 
Upon death prior to the retirement age, the money accumulated by the deceased is paid to 
survivors in the immediate family, with payments being distributed over at least five years. If 
the participant dies during the retirement phase, depending on the insurance chosen, payments 
may be made to the surviving family through a contractual withdrawal period.  In addition, a 
survivor benefit of a specified amount (two times the base amount) paid out during 5 years 
after the death of the policy holder can be purchased within the specified contribution rate. 
This choice reduces the old-age component by the amount of contributions transferred into the 
survivor scheme.  
 
For employees born prior to 1979, employers can choose between paying ITP contributions to 
Alecta (previously a part of SPP) and keeping the debt within the company. Frequently, larger 
companies choose to keep their funds within the company, with the option of moving part of 
their debt over to a trust for portfolio management. In 2006 about 1750 companies chose this 
option.  
 
If companies choose to retain their pension debt, they are required to reinsure it with a 
company set up to perform this function – försäkringsbolaget pensionsgaranti (FPG). When 
the time comes for a participant to draw on her or his pension, FPG assures that the transfer of   60
money is made to Alecta, which administers the payment of all benefits under the ITP 
scheme.  
 
In the new ITP DC scheme for persons born in 1979 and later, the employee chooses his or 
her own insurance company, and, as with ITPK, the participating companies can offer unit-
linked insurance. However, at least 50 percent of total contributions must be held in a 
traditional insurance arrangement. A private clearinghouse, Collectum, has been set up to 
administer the new ITP plan. It contracts participant insurance companies and administers 
contribution payments. A pension can be claimed from age 55 either as a life annuity or as a 
payment over 5 or 10 years. This is a normal product choice within Swedish occupational 
pension schemes.     
 
Blue-collar employees (SAF-LO) 
 
The first supplementary pension plan for employees covered by the SAF-LO
30 agreement was 
reached in 1973, thirteen years after the other three occupational pension schemes adapted 
their then existing plans to the introduction of ATP in 1960.  From 1974 through 1995 those 
covered by the SAF-LO agreement received earnings replacement of 10 percent on top of the 
public benefits for earnings up to the ceiling in the public scheme. In 1996, this DB scheme 
was replaced with a defined contribution financial account scheme. Also, from 1996, there is 
no ceiling on covered earnings.  
 
Persons born in 1968 and later are fully covered by the new scheme. Persons born between 
1932 and 1967 constitute the transition cohorts and receive an individually calculated sum for 
years during which contributions were made prior to 1996. Originally, coverage was provided 
from age 28. In 2002 the age for coverage was reduced to 21. In 2000 the contribution rate 
was increased from 2 to 3.5 %. Following the new agreement for employees covered under 
the ITP plan in 2006 (see above) there is now discussion of also raising the contribution rate 
for the LO collective agreement to the same level, i.e., 4.5 percent. 
 
When the new DC individual account plan was introduced, participants were obliged to keep 
their accounts in one insurance company, AMF (Arbetsmarknadsförsäkringar). From 1999, 
however, participants have been allowed to choose from among the same companies 
participating in the ITPK scheme, which are the major providers of insurance products in 
Sweden.   
 
Local government employees (KAP-KL) 
 
From 1998, all municipal and county council employees
31 born in 1938 and later – the birth 
cohorts covered by the new public system – are covered by KAP-KL. This scheme includes a 
financial defined contribution old-age pension supplement for earnings under the ceiling in 
the public NDC and FDC schemes and a defined-benefit supplement that replaces 62.5 
percent of earnings over the ceiling covered in the public system (7.5 base amounts, which 
was 333 750 SEK in 2006, see Table A1) up to 20 base amounts. There is also an early 
retirement benefit for police and firemen (which can be claimed from age 61) and a defined 
benefit for surviving spouses (and registered cohabitants) and/or the children of a deceased 
                                                 
30 Svenska arbetsgivarföreningen – SAF denotes the Swedish Employers’ Confederation and 
Landsorganisationen – LO is the Swedish Trade Union Confederation. 
31 Excluding workers in the municipal sector covered by the SAF-LO agreement.   61
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1. Earnings up to the ceiling 
in the public system (7.5 
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b) 
FDC plan with 
a contribution 
rate of 4.5% 
FDC plan with 
a contribution 
rate of 3.5 %
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FDC plan with 
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rate of 2.3 % + 
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%. (4.5 % for 








rate of 30% 
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replaces 55 % 
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a Insurance premiums paid by employers are tax deductible on earnings up to 30 basic amounts. 
Employees covered by the SAF-LO agreement are unlikely to have earnings above 20 basic amounts. 
b The basic amount is a unit used in social and private insurance in Sweden. The basic amount 
applicable in the present case was 45 900 SEK or 6851 USD in 2007, with an exchange rate of 6.7 
SEK per USD. The ceiling in the public system was, thus, 51 381 USD in 2006. 
c An increase in the 
contribution rate to 4.5 % is a likely result of discussions at the time of this writing. 
d KÅPAN 
provides coverage from  age 28 and full coverage requires 30 years of participation.
e  A full NDB 
supplement requires 30  years of  coverage from age 28.    62
participant. Rights acquired prior to 1998 in the previous DB scheme are calculated upon 
retirement. 
 
Employees covered by the KAP-KL scheme can choose either traditional or unit-linked 
insurance and from the same companies providing these services to private white collar 
workers and the LO affiliated unions. Employees who do not make an active choice are 
allocated to a default insurance company (KPA Pensionsförsäkring AB).  
 
The conversion from defined benefit to defined contribution benefits for municipal and 
county council employees fulfilled two goals. The first was to bring these schemes into line 
with the new public NDC and FDC schemes. The second was for the municipal and county 
councils to stop accumulating unfunded liabilities at the expense of future taxpayers.   
 
Civil servants and other national government employees (PA-03) 
 
The supplementary pension scheme for national government employees is called PA-03. 
Beginning on January 1 2003, from age 23 all earnings up to 30 base amounts of all 
employees of the state born in 1943
32 and later are covered by a supplementary agreement 
called PA 03 (Table A1). Employers pay a contribution rate of 2.3 percent to the individual 
accounts of their employees. Employees choose either traditional or unit-linked insurance 
from the same providers as in the other schemes that have already been described. The 
contributions for those who do not make an active choice are placed in traditional insurance 
and are reinsured by FSO (Försäkringsföreningen för det statliga området), an insurance 
union for state employees. State employees are also covered by an additional contribution rate 
of 2 percent from age 28 by another older funded scheme, called KÅPAN, in which 
employees have no choice of insurance form or provider. KÅPAN benefits are normally paid 
during a five year period from age 65. 
 
Earnings above the ceiling of 7.5 base amounts are covered by a defined benefit (Table A2). 
Finally, PA – 03 also includes a transition rule for persons born between 1943 and 1972 to 
phase out the DB scheme that preceded it. The transition rule phases out completely the 10 
percent supplement from the old DB scheme covering earnings up to 7.5 base amounts 
(replaced by new FDC plan) and provides a transition from 65 to 60 percent and from 32.5 to 
30 percent for defined benefit for covered earnings above 7.5 base amounts.  
                                                 
32 The exception is air traffic controllers and officers in the military where the first cohorts covered are those 
born 1948.       63
 
 
Table A2. Overview of contractual insurance for birth cohorts covered by the DB 
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See Table 3 for notes a and b. c A full DB pension requires 360 months (30 years) of coverage from age 28. 
Benefits can be claimed at earliest at age 55 and can be postponed until the participant reaches age 70.     
  
d Employees with a salary in excess of 10 base amounts can choose to be in a DC plan instead of the standard 
DB plan. 
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Appendix B:  Statistical Tables 
 
Table B1.a. Schedule for Fund Manager Charges in the PPM system. For fund fees 









Flat rebate rate, 











to PPM, % of  







after rebate, % 
of fund holdings 
of PPM assets 
 
 
1. Managers holding less than 70 million SEK in PPM Funds 
 
1.5 0.4 0.25  0.275  1.225 
1.0 0.4 0.25  0.15  0.85 
0.5 0.4 0.25  0.025  0.475 
0.12 0.4  0.25 0  0.12 
 
2. Managers holding 70 to 300 million SEK in PPM Funds 
 
1.5  0.35 0.65 0.7475  0.7525 
1.0  0.35 0.65 0.4225  0.5775 
0.5  0.35 0.65 0.0975  0.4025 
0.12 0.35 0.65 0  0.12 
 
3. Managers holding 300 million to 500 million SEK in PPM Funds 
 
1.5 0.3 0.85  1.02  0.48 
1.0 0.3 0.85  0.595  0.405 
0.5 0.3 0.85  0.17  0.33 
0.12 0.3  0.85 0  0.12 
 
 
4. Managers holding 500 million to 3000 million SEK in PPM Funds 
 
1.5  0.25 0.95 1.1875  0.3125 
1.0  0.25 0.95 0.7125  0.2875 
0.5  0.25 0.95 0.2375  0.2625 
0.12 0.25 0.95 0  0.12 
 
 
5. Managers holding 3000 to 7000 million SEK in PPM Funds 
 
1.5  0.15 0.95 1.2825  0.2175 
1.0  0.15 0.95 0.8075  0.1925 
0.5  0.15 0.95 0.3325  0.1675 
0.12 0.15 0.95 0  0.12 
 
 
6. Managers holding more than 7000 million SEK in PPM Funds 
 
1.5  0.12 0.96 1.3248  0.1752 
1.0  0.12 0.96 0.8448  0.1552 
0.5  0.12 0.96 0.3648  0.1352 
0.12 0.12 0.96 0  0.12 
 
Source. Constructed by the author using the PPM formula. First published in Palmer (2000). 
 






Table B1.b. Schedule for Fund Manager Charges in the PPM System. For fund fees 
credited individual accounts from 2008 
 
PPM assets under 
management, millions of 
kronor 
 
Free fee, interest bearing 
instruments 
 




































      







Table B2. EU Public Pension Expenditure Projections 
      
                      Year  2004  2030  2050 
Country 
 
   
Belgium 10.4  14.7  15.5 
Denmark 9.5  12.8  12.8 
Germany 11.4  12.3  13.1 
Spain 8.6  11.8  15.7 
France 12.8  14.3  14.8 
Ireland 4.7  7.9  11.1 
Italy 14.2  15.0  14.7 
Netherlands 7.7  10.7  11.2 
Austria 13.4  14.0  12.2 
Portugal 11.1  16.0  20.8 
Finland 10.7  14.0  13.7 
Sweden 10.6  11.1  11.2 
UK 6.6  7.9  8.6 
    
Source. The impact of ageing on public expenditure. Report prepared by the Economic Policy Committee and 
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Table B3. Distribution of tax deducted pension saving, 2003.  
          
 
 
Percent of persons utilizing a 
deduction  
Average amount of premium 





Women  Men Women 
Men and 
Women  Men Women 
          
Age            
-24 år         7.50           7.60             7.40             1.90             2.00             1.70     
25-34       38.50         36.40           40.80             3.20             3.50             2.90     
35-44       45.50         41.30           49.80             4.80             5.40             4.30     
45-54       45.20         38.90           51.70             7.10             8.10             6.40     
55-64       38.60         33.40           43.80             9.60           10.80             8.60     
65-         2.40           3.20             1.90            12.60           14.60             9.90     
20-64       39.40         35.30           43.50             6.00             6.70             5.50     
          
         Income class, 
1000  kronor          
1 kr - 99.9         5.90           4.60             6.80             3.60             3.80             3.50     
100.0 - 119.9       10.50           7.00           11.90             4.10             4.30             4.00     
120.0 - 139.9       14.10           6.80           18.40             4.10             4.40             4.10     
140.0 - 159.9       18.50           7.60           26.40             4.20             4.40             4.20     
160.0 - 179.9       25.10         11.90           34.90             4.30             4.40             4.20     
180.0 - 199.9       31.00         17.90           40.70             4.30             4.30             4.40     
          
200.0 - 219.9       36.20         24.90           46.00             4.40             4.20             4.50     
220.0 - 239.9       40.90         32.40           49.90             4.60             4.20             4.80     
240.0 - 259.9       43.50         37.10           52.40             4.90             4.40             5.30     
260.0 - 279.9       45.90         40.50           54.90             5.30             4.70             5.90     
280.0 - 299.9       47.50         42.20           57.00             5.90             5.30             6.70     
          
300.0 - 339.9       50.00         45.30           59.40             6.90             6.30             7.70     
340.0 - 399.9       52.20         48.20           61.80             8.00             7.70             8.60     
400.0 - 499.9       54.00         50.90           63.60             9.90             9.80           10.40     
500.0 - 999.9       56.80         54.70           66.20            15.00           15.00           14.90     
1000.0 -       45.90         46.70           40.50            26.40           26.90           22.20     
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Table B4. Equivalent Disposable Income.  
Median values, thousands of kronor, 2004 prices.
 
 
Age 1991  1998  2004 
0 -19  124.0  116.6  141.4 
20-24 135.5 116.0 138.7 
25-34 133.2 127.4 155.8 
35-44 138.9 127.9 154.7 
45-54 170.1 158.3 180.4 
55-64 168.2 166.9 203.8 
    
65-74 125.2 131.3 151.5 
75+ 94.4 104.7  118.8 
    
65+ 109.4  116.3  132.9 
All ages  133.9  128.7  153.7 
Source. Statistics Sweden   68
 
Table B5. Number of Recipients and Average Value of Benefits from Public, Contractual and Individual Old 
Age Insurance, 2004. 
                                        
     Of which                          
   Public old age pension       Contractual benefit  
 




































                          
All  1 863 855  135,5   1 571 252  113,8 1 563 149 112,1  1 461 832 40,4   370 547 40,1
                          
55-60  143 788  58,6   0  0 0 0,0  110 588 59,4   50 291 36,8
61-64  178 470  105,0   36 207  63,1 28 569 55,0  137 264 100,6   55 825 47,6
65-69  404 411  167,8   397 646  118,0 397 442 111,0  358 079 42,8   150 624 37,3
70-74  345 153  156,3   345 128  125,1 345 128 125,1  288 900 28,7   59 959 41,5
75-79  312 167  140,9   312 154  117,5 312 154 117,5  242 082 25,8   25 047 41,6
80-84  264 352  130,0   264 349  108,9 264 349 108,9  189 950 25,9   15 840 42,5
85-89  143 187  122,3   143 183  101,3 143 183 101,3  94 249 27,9   8 764 42,9
90-  72 327  107,6   72 324  88,6 72 324 88,6  40 720 29,8   4 197 37,9
                          
Women 1 045 573  105,2   889 155  93,4 884 154 92,4  783 549 27,1   182 346 31,7
                          
55-60  80 106  39,2   0  0 0 0,0  63 061 38,4   26 238 27,4
61-64  89 049  68,7   15 551  43,9 10 809 44,1  69 396 64,4   27 311 35,2
65-69  207 541  134,8   204 601  100,6 204 490 95,1  180 422 27,9   78 603 30,0
70-74  185 573  124,6   185 563  103,9 185 563 103,9  150 882 19,6   26 752 33,0
75-79  176 604  110,8   176 598  95,3 176 598 95,3  130 503 18,3   10 276 35,2
80-84  159 370  101,2   159 369  87,0 159 369 87,0  106 121 18,9   6 828 38,9
85-89  94 063  96,7   94 061  82,0 94 061 82,0  56 227 21,9   4 062 39,3
90-  53 267  91,7   53 264  76,9 53 264 76,9  26 937 26,4   2 276 34,0
                          
Men  818 282  174,2   682 097  140,3 678 995 137,8  678 283 55,7   188 201 48,2
                          
55-60  63 682  82,9   0  0 0 0,0  47 527 87,2   24 053 47,1
61-64  89 421  141,2   20 656  77,6 17 760 61,7  67 868 137,5   28 514 59,5
65-69  196 870  202,6   193 045  136,5 192 952 127,8  177 657 57,9   72 021 45,3
70-74  159 580  193,3   159 565  149,7 159 565 149,7  138 018 38,7   33 207 48,3
75-79  135 563  180,0   135 556  146,5 135 556 146,5  111 579 34,6   14 771 46,1
80-84  104 982  173,7   104 980  142,1 104 980 142,1  83 829 34,7   9 012 45,2
85-89  49 124  171,2   49 122  138,4 49 122 138,4  38 022 36,8   4 702 45,9
90-  19 060  152,1    19 060  121,4 19 060 121,4   13 783 36,5    1 921 42,6
Note. 
1In 2001 the folkpension, a flat rate benefit pro-rated with years of residence up to 40 and with a reduction 
for spouses, was converted into a guarantee benefit in the new system  Since the entire stock of pensioners at the 
time had a folkpension as the first pillar in the public system, as a result of the conversion, they all received a 
guarantee benefit after the reform.    
Source. Statistics Sweden 
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Table B6. Top 50 PPM Funds, October 31, 2007. PPM data. 
Rank Fund Women  Men  All    Bill. SEK   Fund  type 
1  Premiesparfonden  1158573 1248120 2406693   83,3    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
2  AMF Pensions Aktiefond - Sverige  209747 220147 429894   10,1    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
3  AMF Pensions Aktiefond - Världen  160232 161776 322008   8,1    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
4  Swedbank Robur Aktiefond Pension  148982 122945 271927   7,5    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
5  Didner & Gerge Aktiefond  140085 146440 286525   7,0    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
6  SPP Generation 60-tal  84881 68063 152944   5,5    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
7  Baring Hong Kong China Fund  55996 77481 133477   5,0    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
8  SPP Generation 50-tal  67861 59969 127830   5,0    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
9  Swedbank Robur Contura  193212 192756 385968   3,9    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
10  AMF Pensions Balansfond  81666 72402 154068   3,7    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
11  HQ Rysslandsfond  35028 52816 87844   3,4    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
12  SKAGEN Global  100464 116043 216507   3,3    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
13  Folksam LO Sverige  60569 60944 121513   3,2    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
14  SPP Generation 70-tal  59348 43999 103347   2,9    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
15  SPP Generation 40-tal  59655 54343 113998   2,6    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
16  Premievalsfonden  57165 45454 102619   2,5    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
17  Swedbank Robur Östeuropafond  48612 55229 103841   2,3    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
18  Swedbank Robur Småbolagsfond Europa  65673 60723 126396   2,2    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
19  East Capital Rysslandsfonden  33229 45738 78967   2,2    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
20  Folksam LO Världen  63003 60749 123752   2,1    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
21  Swedbank Robur Medica  114835 105377 220212   2,1    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
22  SPP Aktieindexfond Sverige  41978 47378 89356   1,8    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
23  Swedbank Robur Transfer 60  24433 16483 40916   1,8    Foreign stocks & interest bearing instruments  
24  Carnegie Fund - WorldWide Sub-Fund  47148 44457 91605   1,8    Generation fund, 10 yrs. from retirement 
25  Swedbank Robur Rysslandsfond  33772 42714 76486   1,8    Russia 
26 Folksams  Penningmarknadsfond  47556 45075 92631   1,8    Sweden long money market  instruments 
27  Carnegie Fund - Medical Sub-Fund  78394 73496 151890   1,8    Europe 
28 SKAGEN  Kon-Tiki  50857 63114 113971   1,8    Pharmaceuticals 
29  Carlson Fund Equity - Asian Small Cap  26588 35272 61860   1,7    China 
30  Swedbank Robur Sverigefond MEGA  44146 40739 84885   1,7    Generation fund, 20 yrs. from retirement 
31  Swedbank Robur Transfer 70  24215 18897 43112   1,7    Sweden, index 
32  Swedbank Robur Mixfond Pension  51019 34630 85649   1,6    Sweden 
33  Swedbank Robur Europafond MEGA  51086 44165 95251   1,4    Small companies 
34  Folksams Aktiefond Sverige  34884 33403 68287   1,4    Sweden 
35  Swedbank Robur Transfer 50  20493 12896 33389   1,3    Europe 
36  Swedbank Robur Nordenfond  29055 31323 60378   1,3    Nordic short-term money market instruments 
37  SEB Europafond  35495 41155 76650   1,3    Small companies, Europe 
38  East Capital Balkanfonden  22731 29215 51946   1,2    China 
39  JPM - Emerging Markets Equity Fund  39832 41744 81576   1,2    Global 
40  Swedbank Robur Småbolagsfond Norden  33613 31531 65144   1,2    Eastern Europe 
41  Nordea Europafond  40503 38570 79073   1,2    Asia and the Far East 
42  Länsförsäkringar Pension 2015  18868 18121 36989   1,2    Sweden 
43 SEB  Läkemedelsfond  55546 54362 109908   1,2    Pharmaceuticals 
44  Nordea Tillväxtbolagsfond  38888 37042 75930   1,1    Asia and the Far East 
45  Swedbank Robur Globalfond MEGA  45781 39246 85027   1,1    Asia and the Far East 
46  AMF Pensions Europafond - Euro  27355 33384 60739   1,1    Europe 
47  Länsförsäkringar Pension 2020  14301 13241 27542   1,1    North America  
48  Gustavia Balkan  17827 22761 40588   1,1    Balkan index 
49 Kaupthing  Kina  12095 19750 31845   1,1    China 
50  SPP Aktieindexfond Europa  31155 30449 61604   1,1    Europe 
  Sum, Top 50  4038430 4106127 8144557   208,8     
  Top 50, % of total  62% 62% 62%   71%       70
 
Table B7. Outstanding nominal Swedish government bonds, March 31, 2006 
       
  
Date of issuance 
 
Date of redemption 
 
Rate of interest 
Amount,  
billions of SEK 
        
1.  20/4    1999  20/4    2006  3.50  35.3 
2.  25/10  1996  25/10  2006  6.50  1.1 
3.  15/8    1995  15/8    2007  8.00  79.9 
4.  5/5      1997  5/5      2008  6.50  58.2 
5.  28/1    1998  28/1    2009  5.00  71.6 
6.  20/4    1993  20/4    2009  9.00  1.0 
7.  15/3    2004  1/12    2009  4.00  50.0 
8.  8/11    2000  15/3    2011  5.25  62.0 
9.  13/3    2002  8/10    2012  5.50  44.7 
10.  5/5      1997  5/5      2014  6.75  63.8 
11.  6/9      2004  12/8    2015  4.50  36.5 
12.  19/9    2005  12/7    2016  3.00  32.0 
13.        28/1    2004  1/12    2020  5.00  40.2 
        
All bonds  -  -  5.50
1  576.3 
Money weighted duration  5 years  -  - 
  Total government debt  -  -  -  1267.7 
      
1Money weighted average. 
Sources: The Swedish National Debt Office and the author’s calculations. 
 
   71
REFERENCES 
 
Berg, Lennart, 1983. Konsumtion och sparande – en studie av hushållens beteende. Uppsala: 
Uppsala University. 
 
Brown, Jeffery, 2000. How Should We Insure Longevity Risk in Pensions and Social 
Security? An Issue in Brief, Boston College Center for Retirement Research, no. 4.  
 
Brown, Jeffery R., Olivia S. Mitchell and James M. Poterba, 2002. Mortality Risk, Inflation 
Risk and Annuity Products in Olivia S. Mitchell, Zvi Bodie, P. Brett Hammond and Stephen 
Zeldes (eds.) Innovations in Retirement Financing. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
 
Cardinale, Mirko, Alec Findlater and Mike Orszag, 2002. The Role of Annuity Markets in 
Financing Retirement. Cambridge, Mass.:The MIT Press. 
 
Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission (DG ECFIN), 2006. Special 
Report no. 1/2006. Brussels: European Commission.   
 
Eklöf, Matias and Daniel Hallberg, 2006. “Estimating Retirement Behavior with Special 
Retirement Offers” mimeograph. Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 
Sweden.  
 
Frennberg, Per and Björn Hansson, 1995. ”An Evaluation of Alternative Models for 
Predicting Stock Volatility: Evidence from a Small Stock Market,” Journal of International 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money. Vol 5, No 2/3, pp. 117-134. 
 
FSA, 2004. Finanssektorns stabilitet 2004 (The financial sector’s stability – 2004). Rapport 
den 15 oktober 2004. Stockholm: The Financial Supervisory Authority.   
 
FSA 2005. Trafikljuset och en modernare tillsyn – remissförslag. Rapport den 6 oktober 
2005. Stockholm: The Financial Supervisory Authority. 
 
Holzmann, Robert and Edward Palmer, 2006. Pension Reform through NDCs: Issues and 
Prospects for Non-Financial Defined Contribution Schemes. Editor with R. Holzmann. World 
Bank: Washington DC. 
 
Impavido, Gregorio, Craig Thorburn and Mike Wadsworth, 2003. A Conceptual Framework 
for Retirement Products: Risk Sharing Arrangements between Providers and Retirees. 
London: Watson Wyatt. 
 
Johannisson, Inger 2000. ”Tax Deferred Pension Saving in Sweden”, mimeograph. 
Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg.  
 
Markowski, Aleksander and Edward Palmer, 1979. Social Insurance and Saving in Sweden in 
George M. Von Furstenberg (ed.) Social Security versus Private Saving.  
Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Co. 
   72
McGill, Dan M., Kyle N. Brown, John J Haley and Sylvester J. Schieber, 2005. Fundamentals 
of Private Pensions Eighth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Mitchell, Olivia and David McCarthy, 2002. Annuities for an Ageing World. Working Paper 
9092. Cambridge, Ma.:National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge.  
 
Palmer, Edward, 1981. Determination of Personal Consumption – Theoretical Foundations 
and Empirical Evidence from Sweden. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell International. 
 
Palmer, Edward, 1985. Household Saving in Sweden and Its Composition – An Empirical 
Analysis. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International. 
 
Palmer, Edward, 2002. Swedish Pension Reform – How Did It Evolve and What Does It 
Mean for the Future? in M. Feldstein and H. Siebert (eds.) Coping with the Pension Crisis: 
Where Does Europe Stand? Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2002.  
 
Palmer, Edward and Eskil Wadensjö, 2004. Public Pension Reform and Contractual 
Agreements in Sweden – Future Directions in M. Rein and W. Schmäll (eds.), The Political 
Economy of Pension Reform. Cheltenham,UK: Edward Elgar.  
 
Palmer, Edward, 2006. What Is NDC? in R. Holzmann and E. Palmer (eds.) Pension Reform 
through NDCs: Issues and Prospects for Non-Financial Defined Contribution Schemes. 
World Bank: Washington DC. 
Reformed Pension System – Costs and Individual Effects (Reformerat pensionssystem – 
Kostnader och individeffekter), 1994. Sveriges Offentliga Utredningar SOU 1994:21, 
Betänkande av Pensionsarbetsgruppen, Bilaga A. Stockholm:Sweden’s Official Publicatioons. 
 
Statistics Sweden, 2004. De äldres ekonomiska välfärd (The Economic Welfare of the 
Elderly). Stockholm: Statistics Sweden 
 
 
 
  
 